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UNEARTHING THE PUBLIC INTEREST:  
RECOGNIZING INTRASTATE ECONOMIC 
PROTECTIONISM AS A LEGITIMATE 
STATE INTEREST 
Katharine M. Rudish* 
 
In Oklahoma, a person must complete sixty-credit hours of 
undergraduate training and embalm twenty-five bodies before being legally 
licensed to sell caskets in the state.  In Louisiana, in order to sell caskets, 
one must operate a fully licensed funeral establishment, defined as a place 
dedicated to preparing bodies for burial.  In recent years, these states and 
others have faced legal challenges to casket sale restrictions by individuals 
who wish to sell caskets directly to the public, yet who are unable to do so 
as they are not licensed funeral directors.  Courts have grappled with 
whether these state regulations, which in effect restrict sales of caskets to 
funeral home operators, violate the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This Note explores the constitutionality of state licensing schemes that 
limit casket sales to registered funeral directors.  It begins by exploring the 
constitutional framework of economic substantive due process and equal 
protection jurisprudence.  Next, this Note briefly addresses pluralist theory 
and interest group theory before turning to a brief overview of the FTC’s 
Funeral Rule.  This Note then presents the current split between the Tenth 
and Sixth Circuits regarding whether economic protectionism of an in-state 
industry constitutes a legitimate state interest.  Ultimately, this Note argues 
that while the U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly articulated that 
intrastate economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest—instead 
requiring regulations to be tethered to a public purpose as constrained by 
the contours of the state’s traditional police powers—the Court has 
implicitly accepted such a goal as legitimate due to the deferential nature of 
the Court’s review of state economic regulations.  This Note thus argues 
that the Supreme Court should make explicit its implicit endorsement that 
economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest precisely because 
economic protectionism may, in the state’s own legislative wisdom, 
plausibly serve the public interest. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2013, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2010, New York 
University.  I would like to thank my family and friends for their constant encouragement 
and support.  I am especially grateful to Colin for his immeasurable patience. 
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For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the 
polls, not to the courts.1 
As a creature of politics, the definition of the public good changes with 
the political winds.  There simply is no constitutional or Platonic form 
against which we can (or could) judge the wisdom of economic 
regulation.2 
In Oklahoma, a person must complete sixty-credit hours of 
undergraduate training and embalm twenty-five bodies before being legally 
licensed to sell caskets in the state.3  One also must have a preparation room 
capable of embalming bodies and “a funeral-service merchandise-selection 
room with an inventory of not less than five caskets, and adequate areas for 
public viewing of human remains.”4 
 
 1. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 
U.S. 113, 134 (1876)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 3. See The Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 395.1 
(2011); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2004); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 235:10-1-2, 10-3-1 (2010). 
 4. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1213. 
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In Tennessee prior to 2010,5 to be licensed to sell a casket in the state, 
one was required either to complete one year of course work at an 
accredited mortuary school and a one-year apprenticeship with a licensed 
funeral director, or to do a full two-year apprenticeship.6  The required 
coursework at the only mortuary school in Tennessee included “eight credit 
hours in embalming, three in ‘restorative art,’ and twenty-one in ‘funeral 
service.’”7  In addition, one was required to pass the Tennessee Funeral 
Arts Examination.8 
In Louisiana, in order to sell caskets, one must be licensed as a funeral 
establishment, which is defined as “any place or premises duly licensed by 
the board and devoted to or used in the care and preparation for burial of the 
body of a deceased person.”9 
These three states are among those whose courts have recently grappled 
with whether these state regulations, which in effect restrict the sales of 
caskets to funeral home operators, violate the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by treating funeral 
directors differently from other would-be casket sellers and by irrationally 
infringing on the individual liberty to engage in a trade.10 
In Part I, this Note explores the constitutional framework of economic 
substantive due process and equal protection jurisprudence, then briefly 
addresses pluralist theory and interest group theory before turning to a brief 
overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Funeral Rule.  Then, in 
Part II this Note lays out the current circuit split over whether economic 
protectionism of an in-state industry constitutes a legitimate state interest.  
In Part III, this Note argues that while the U.S. Supreme Court has never 
explicitly articulated that intrastate economic protectionism is a legitimate 
state interest, instead requiring regulations be tethered to some traditionally 
circumscribed public purpose, the Court has implicitly accepted such a goal 
as legitimate due to its deferential review of state economic regulations.  
This Note thus argues that the Supreme Court should expand its conception 
of state police powers to acknowledge that economic protectionism 
plausibly serves a public purpose, and make explicit its implicit 
endorsement that economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest. 
I.  THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES:  A HISTORICAL 
AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Part I begins by detailing the development of the Supreme Court’s 
economic substantive due process and equal protection jurisprudence under 
rational basis review and discusses the diverging conceptions of the limits, 
 
 5. The statute was amended in 2010 following the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 6. Id. at 222 (quoting TENN. CODE. ANN. § 62-5-101(a)(3)(A)(ii) (1997)). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. LA. REV. STAT. 37:831(37) (West 2012). 
 10. See infra Part II. 
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if any, on the states’ police powers.  Next, it analyzes pluralist theory and 
interest group theory, concluding with an overview of the funeral industry 
and the FTC Funeral Rule. 
A.  Constitutional Framework:  The U.S. Federal System 
In the U.S. federal system, the U.S. Constitution grants the federal 
government limited, enumerated powers.11  For example, the Constitution 
explicitly grants Congress the power to raise taxes, coin money, and 
regulate interstate commerce.12  Congress has the power to pass laws and 
regulate using legislation that is “necessary and proper” to achieve these 
and other enumerated ends explicitly listed in the Constitution.13  Since 
Article I of the Constitution begins by declaring that “[a]ll legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress,”14 by negative 
inference, all legislative powers not expressly granted to Congress in the 
Constitution remain the sole domain of the states through operation of the 
Tenth Amendment.15 
Of particular relevance to this Note, the Constitution itself has only a few 
references to property rights, all expressed in general terms such as 
“property,” or “contract.”16  Besides the Contracts Clause found in Article 
I, which provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts,”17 most economic liberties specifically referenced 
in the text reside in the Bill of Rights and subsequent amendments.18  The 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments specifically 
refer to property rights, with the Fifth Amendment providing that “[n]o 
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”19 
 
 11. See ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 3 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 13. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411–13 (1819). 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 15. See infra notes 23–33 and accompanying text.  The Tenth Amendment provides that:  
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
Whether and to what extent the Tenth Amendment “reserves a zone of authority exclusively 
to the states” has been much debated.  CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 3. 
 16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“Contracts”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]roperty”); 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (same). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.  Early on in its jurisprudence, the Court read the Contracts 
Clause narrowly, limiting its protection considerably. See CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 
629  (describing how the Contracts Clause applies only if local or state law interferes with 
existing contracts, and thus does not apply to infringement by the federal government or to 
future contract terms); James W. Ely, Jr., The Protection of Contractual Rights:  A Tale of 
Two Constitutional Provisions, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 370, 377–83 (2005) (detailing the 
shift that occurred between 1875 and 1905 from using the Contracts Clause to using the Due 
Process Clause to strike down state laws). 
 18. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 735 (6th ed. 2009). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (differing from the 
Fifth Amendment, in that it provides that “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law” (emphasis added)). 
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However, most critical to this Note, the Court has at times protected 
other economic liberties not found in the constitutional text.20  These 
unenumerated economic liberties protect more specific rights, including 
“freedom of contract, freedom to pursue a livelihood, and freedom to 
practice a trade or profession.”21  To find constitutional guarantees for these 
rights, the Court first relied on natural law conceptions of the “fundamental 
laws of every free government,”22 the inherent limitations of state police 
powers, and later used the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause to 
protect substantive, as opposed to merely procedural, rights from erosion by 
the states.23  The next subsections will address these approaches, and the 
extremely divergent outcomes24 that have resulted throughout U.S. history. 
1.  State Police Powers:  Undefined Powers, Unclear Limits 
In contrast to the federal government’s limited authority, the states, 
through their police powers, have extremely broad authority.  The term 
“police power” appears nowhere in the constitutional text,25 and 
“[g]enerations of judges and scholars have suggested that . . . state police 
power is undefinable.”26  Through these broad powers the states can 
regulate for the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens.27  
However, the limits, if any, on the police powers are difficult to delineate.28 
The classical liberal tradition in which the Constitution is grounded29 
places limits on the states’ power to regulate using their police powers.30  
Stemming from Lockean social contract theory, states and local 
 
 20. See infra Part I.A.1–2, I.B.1–2. 
 21. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 606.  Also, more recently, some scholars have 
championed recognizing a fundamental right to earn a living. See generally TIMOTHY 
SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING:  ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW (2010) 
(advocating for “the right to earn a living” to be a protected fundamental right). 
 22. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815). 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 606–07; see also 
infra Part I.B. 
 24. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 606 (“The Supreme Court’s protection of 
economic liberties has varied enormously over time.”). 
 25. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 9 (2006). 
 26. 2 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
136 (1893) (“The police power . . . is the ‘dark continent’ of our jurisprudence.  It is the 
convenient repository of everything for which our juristic classifications can find no other 
place.”); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE:  LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 13, 255 (1996) (“We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has 
been known as the police power.  An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is 
fruitless . . . .” (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Walter Wheeler Cook, What is the Police Power?, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 322, 
322 (1907) (“No phrase is more frequently used and at the same time less understood than 
the [police powers].”). 
 27. See infra Part I.A.1; see also NOVAK, supra note 26, at 13 (noting that the 
constitutional basis for police power is the Tenth Amendment). 
 28. See NOVAK, supra note 26, at 13. 
 29. See EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 16 (“[T]he Constitution is unambiguously in the 
classical liberal camp.”). 
 30. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 16. 
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governments,31 using their police powers, can only regulate for the general 
health, welfare, and safety of their citizens, since only these situations 
constitute “collective action” problems in which state regulation is 
necessary to combat “market failure[s].”32  The assumption under this 
conception is that free market competition will satisfactorily allocate private 
resources, and that government regulation is legitimate only when the 
competitive market cannot be trusted.33  Under this conception,34 individual 
property rights could be regulated when “necessary for the public good.”35 
In addition to “common pool” problems of the allocation of scarce 
resources, the classical liberal tradition also justifies government 
intervention as necessary to combat the market failure incident to natural 
monopolies.36  Thus, common carriers and utilities were deemed proper 
targets of governmental regulation since they were “affected with the public 
interest” as natural monopolies.37 
Nevertheless, in Munn v. Illinois,38 the Court blurred the line between 
permissible and impermissible regulation by purporting to find an Illinois 
statute setting the maximum price of grain elevators (which did not 
constitute a monopoly) analogous to common carriers and thus a legitimate 
target of state regulation.39  It is unclear, however, what supported the 
Court’s conclusion that grain elevators were distinguishable from other 
ordinary businesses, such as tailors and shoemakers, whom the state did not 
have the power to regulate using its police powers.40 
 
 31. See NOVAK, supra note 26, at 13 (noting that the term “state police power” is 
misleading because, among other reasons, it historically was local, as opposed to state, 
power). 
 32. See EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 16–17.  The classical liberal tradition is juxtaposed 
against the pure libertarian position, which finds any forced exchange for the common good 
illegitimate. Id. at 16. 
 33. See id. at 17 (“Thus, government may restrict the acquisition . . . of forms of wildlife 
and natural resources that are subject to premature dissipation through the standard common-
pool problem . . . .”). 
 34. The U.S. adopted this conception of the police powers from England, where 
sovereign power was constrained by the conception of a “body politic” grounded in social 
contract theory. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1876) (“[T]he police powers . . . are 
nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty. . . .” 
(quoting The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 35. Id. at 125 (emphasis added); see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, 
REGULATED INDUSTRIES 79 (4th ed. 1999). 
 36. See EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 17; PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 35, at 78–80. 
 37. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 35, at 81–82. But see New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 302–03 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The notion of a distinct 
category of business ‘affected with a public interest,’ . . . rests upon historical error . . . .  In 
my opinion, the true principle is that the State’s power extends to every regulation of any 
business reasonably required and appropriate for the public protection.”). 
 38. 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
 39. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 35, at 78–79. 
 40. See id. at 80.  At the time that the states were prevented from passing such 
regulations, the federal government was also unable to regulate, as its Commerce Clause 
powers were read narrowly. See Daniel A. Farber, Who Killed Lochner? 90 GEO. L.J. 985, 
989 (2002) (reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000), 
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2.  Unenumerated Rights Protected by Natural Law Principles 
In the early nineteenth century, in an effort to protect those economic 
rights not explicitly provided for in the constitutional text, the Court utilized 
natural law principles to safeguard certain economic liberties deemed 
natural at common law.41  These natural rights precluded legislatures from 
interfering with people’s rights to possess and own property, creating a 
sphere of constitutional protection for rights not specifically found in the 
Constitution.42  In Calder v. Bull,43 for example, the Court displayed a 
willingness to adopt natural law principles as a legitimate means to render 
decisions:  “An ACT of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to 
the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a 
rightful exercise of legislative authority.”44  Justice Chase’s concurrence in 
Calder, however, revealed a distaste for natural law principles45 that was 
ultimately adopted by the Court as it shifted away from using natural law 
principles as a legitimate means of adjudication.46  Although the Court’s 
explicit reliance on natural law evaporated, this shift did not cause the Court 
to enforce only those economic rights enumerated in the Constitution; 
rather, these natural law principles migrated to the doctrine of substantive 
due process.47 
 
which explains that Congress the lacked power under the Commerce Clause to regulate a 
nationwide sugar manufacturing monopoly in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 
(1895)). 
 41. See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–88 (1798). See 
generally CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 608–09. 
 42. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 608–09; Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an 
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 715–16 (1975) (“[I]t came to be accepted 
that the judiciary had the power to enforce the commands of the written Constitution when 
these conflicted with ordinary law, it was also widely assumed that judges would enforce as 
constitutional restraints the unwritten natural rights as well.”). 
 43. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386. 
 44. Id. at 388 (emphasis omitted).  There is some evidence that the Founding Fathers 
intended to imbue in the constitutional framework unenumerated liberties using a theory of 
natural law. Cf. Susan P. Stuart, Fun with Dick and Jane and Lawrence:  A Primer on 
Education Privacy As Constitutional Liberty, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 563, 577–78 (2004) 
(discussing how Alexander Hamilton envisioned that “‘liberty’ filled the bill by 
encompassing all the fundamental rights of Englishmen”). 
 45. See Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 (Chase, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court cannot pronounce 
[the law] to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of 
natural justice.  The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard:  the ablest 
and purest men have differed upon the subject . . . .”). 
 46. See Hon. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1514 (2011) (noting the trend against using natural law reasoning in 
contemporary legal society). 
 47. See Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of 
Rights?  The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140, 165 (1949) (“Substantive due 
process[’s] . . . true source is . . . to be found in . . . concepts of natural law which have had 
strong influence upon the legal thinking of this country.  These concepts, historically 
separate from the English concept of due process, have by judicial fiat been grafted upon the 
venerable phrase [of substantive due process].”); O’Scannlain, supra note 46, at 
1515 (“Lochner, and similar cases of that age, were seen as instances of ‘natural law 
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B.  The Evolution of Economic Substantive Due Process 
Originally, the rights guaranteed to the people through the Bill of Rights 
were held to apply only to actions by the federal government and not 
actions taken by state or local actors.48  The logic of this holding was that a 
removed federal government should not encroach on those liberties already 
governed separately under state and local law.49 
Over time, the Court developed the incorporation doctrine to remedy this 
gap.50  The Fourteenth Amendment, one of the three Reconstruction 
Amendments, was ratified on July 9, 1868,51 and was specifically directed 
at abuses by state legislatures.52  The Amendment aimed to shift the balance 
of power between the federal and state governments.53  Specifically, the 
incorporation doctrine utilized the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause to make the Bill of Rights applicable against the states.54  It 
accomplished this by interpreting the term “liberty” found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to include, at a minimum, some of the rights protected by the 
first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights.55 
State economic regulations are analyzed under the theory of substantive 
due process, which, like the incorporation doctrine, derives from the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.56  Unlike the incorporation 
doctrine, however, substantive due process reads into the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause not just the explicitly enumerated 
 
reasoning.’  Thus, criticism of ‘the Lochner era’ became bound up with criticism of the 
natural law.”). 
 48. See Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833). 
 49. See id. at 249–50. 
 50. See Dale E. Ho, Dodging a Bullet:  McDonald v. City of Chicago and the Limits of 
Progressive Originalism, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 369, 379 (2010); Richard J. Hunter, 
Jr. & Hector R. Lozada, A Nomination of a Supreme Court Justice:  The Incorporation 
Doctrine Revisited, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 365, 384–85 (2010).  The Court turned to the 
incorporation doctrine after its decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, which essentially 
removed the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause from providing federal 
protection of individual liberties against state action. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74–75 (1872). 
 51. See William R. Musgrove, Note, Substantive Due Process:  A History of Liberty in 
the Due Process Clause, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 125 (2008).  The first 
section of the amendment granted citizenship to all freed slaves, see id., thus overturning 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 52. The Fourteenth Amendment explicitly aims at state action:  “No State shall . . . .” 
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 53. See David Krinsky, A Plan Revised:  How The Congressional Power To Abrogate 
State Sovereign Immunity Has Expanded Since The Eleventh Amendment, 93 GEO. L.J. 2067, 
2082 (2005).  Likewise, the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had similar goals. Id. 
 54. See Ho, supra note 50, at 379. 
 55. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  Select provisions of the Bill of Rights proceeded 
to be incorporated on a piecemeal basis, encompassing a victory for Justice Frankfurter’s 
preferred methodology over Justice Black’s favored “total” incorporation approach. See 
generally STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 731–33 (discussing the Black-Frankfurter 
incorporation debate). 
 56. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1; Musgrove, supra note 51, at 125–26; see also 
infra Part I.B. 
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liberties found in the Bill of Rights,57 but also unenumerated individual 
liberties—liberties that are not specifically found in the constitutional 
text.58 
The Court gradually59 turned to the term “liberty” in the Due Process 
Clause to safeguard unenumerated economic liberties against government 
intrusion.60  Defining what constitutes “liberty” within the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause has sparked intense debate for much of U.S. 
constitutional history.61  Some scholars have argued that the Framers of the 
Constitution were chiefly concerned with protecting individual economic 
rights when they drafted the Constitution.62  Regardless of the Framers’ 
actual intent, by the mid-nineteenth century, the Court found freedom of 
contract to be “a basic right under the liberty and property provisions of the 
due process clause.”63 
1.  The Lochner v. New York Decision 
While the Court hinted at protecting unenumerated rights using the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause before its famous decision64 
 
 57. The incorporation doctrine has also been used to incorporate unenumerated rights. 
See STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 733.  In fact, the incorporation doctrine can be 
conceptualized as a form of substantive due process, since it protects substantive 
fundamental rights from state action, albeit enumerated rights. See Peter J. Rubin, Square 
Pegs and Round Holes:  Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of 
Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 842 (2003) (“The most commonplace form of fundamental 
rights analysis—so commonplace that it is often treated as though it were not substantive due 
process at all—is the incorporation of the Bill of Rights provisions against the states.”). 
 58. See Jed Storey Crumbo, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Right to Privacy—
Government Contract Employees’ Right to Informational Privacy, 79 TENN. L. REV. 417, 
422–23 (2012). 
 59. See Morrison, supra note 47, at 165 (noting that substantive due process began 
developing in the late nineteenth century). 
 60. See infra Part I.B. 
 61. See Stuart, supra note 44, at 576–78 (noting the large number of competing theories 
regarding the Framers’ conception of “liberty” and arguing that “the historical smorgasbord 
of choices was somewhat overwhelming, and no particular tradition of liberty is 
discernible”) (footnote omitted). 
 62. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913) (arguing that the impetus behind drafting the 
Constitution was a desire to protect individual private property and wealth). But cf. 
CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 606 (describing how subsequent historians challenged 
Beard’s analysis and conclusions, but arguing that ultimately there is little doubt that the 
Framers were motivated in part by an impulse to protect economic rights). 
 63. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 606; see, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 
525, 545 (1923) (“That the right to contract about one’s affairs is a part of the liberty of the 
individual protected by [the Due Process] [C]lause, is settled by the decisions of this Court 
and is no longer open to question.” (citing, inter alia, N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 
357, 373–74 (1918))); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 16 (1915) (voiding act prohibiting 
yellow dog contracts because the act “intended to deprive employers of a part of their liberty 
of contract, to the corresponding advantage of the employed”); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 
412, 421 (1908); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908), overruled in part by 
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941)). 
 64. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 
U.S. 623 (1887); Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884). 
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in Lochner v. New York,65 it was not until Lochner that the Court formally 
recognized the novel doctrine of substantive due process.66 
In Lochner, the Supreme Court famously invalidated a New York statute 
that regulated the maximum hours of bakers.67  The statute limited the 
amount of hours a baker could work to ten hours a day and sixty hours a 
week, with certain exceptions.68  Justice Peckham, writing for the majority, 
concluded that “[t]he statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract 
between the employer and employes,”69 and thus struck down the law as 
infringing on the substantive right of liberty of contract.70 
Although the text of the Constitution does not explicitly protect the “right 
to contract,” the Court used the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to protect such a right, reasoning that the clause 
protects not just procedural safeguards,71 but also substantive rights.72  This 
allowed the Court to strike down the maximum hours legislation as 
unconstitutionally violating the Due Process Clause, since it interfered with 
the right to contract.73  The effect of the substantive due process doctrine 
was to insulate certain rights—in Lochner, the right to contract—from the 
reach of governmental regulation.74 
Justice Peckham’s majority opinion in Lochner and Justice Holmes’s 
dissent disagreed over what ends states can legitimately seek to serve 
through the use of the police power and the amount of deference the federal 
judiciary should accord state legislative actions.75  While Peckham defined 
the police power as “relat[ing] to the safety, health, morals[,] and general 
welfare of the public,”76 Holmes’s dissent seemed to reject such a civil 
republican conception of the general welfare in favor of a pluralist 
 
 65. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 
(1937). 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. at 64. 
 68. See id. at 46 n.1. 
 69. Id. at 53. 
 70. See id. at 64–65. 
 71. Procedural due process rights previously were the only components of due process 
protected from government infringement. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 545.  
Procedural due process involves the right to the legal and legislative mechanisms that ensure 
fair process. See id.  By contrast, the substantive component of the Due Process Clause 
“provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental 
rights and liberty interests.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
 72. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62.  Substantive due process has been called a 
“contradiction in terms—sort of like ‘green pastel redness’” because due process originally 
was synonymous with procedural processes. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980). 
 73. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
 74. See STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 736. 
 75. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53; id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 53 (majority opinion). 
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approach, whereby states can regulate based on the will of those who 
manage to wrestle legislative power.77 
While conceding that the state has the authority, using its police powers, 
to regulate for the health and safety of the general public, the Court in 
Lochner embarked on a searching investigation of the intent behind the 
legislation, revealing extraordinary skepticism about the state’s proffered 
rationale.78  In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the state’s 
proffered health and safety rationale,79 believing instead that the legislation 
was, in fact, “passed from other motives.”80  The Court interpreted these 
motives as intending to interfere with the ability of employers to freely 
contract with their employees in the free market,81 reflecting the 
redistributive aims of the legislature.82  The majority thus read the New 
York statute as aimed at the redistribution of property, something the Court 
implicitly rejected in favor of its laissez-faire economic theory.83  Because 
of the Court’s belief that the legislature aimed to take away the employer’s 
ability to contract with its employees, the Court found the regulation 
violated the liberty of contract as read into the Due Process Clause.84 
Justice Holmes dissented from the Lochner majority, rejecting what he 
saw as the majority substituting its own economic theory for that of the 
New York state legislature.85  Holmes wrote that his personal preferred 
economic theory had nothing to do with whether a state legislature has the 
power to “embody their opinions in law,”86 conveying his belief that it is 
not a judge’s place to determine whether the will of a democratic majority 
must conform to a particular economic theory and what that theory must be. 
According to Professor Sunstein, Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner 
“comes close to modern interest-group pluralism, which treats the political 
process as an unprincipled struggle among self-interested groups for scarce 
 
 77. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 879 (1987) (noting 
that Holmes’s dissent in Lochner is a rejection of the principal of neutrality which demands 
that state legislatures pass laws of neutral application for the general welfare). 
 78. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58–65. 
 79. Id. at 58 (“There is, in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be 
necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public health . . . .”).  However, as 
Justice Harlan’s dissent makes clear, the degree to which working as a baker was detrimental 
to health was far from clear, with multiple sources citing it as an extremely hazardous 
occupation due to inhaling large amounts of flour dust. Id. at 69–71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
Furthermore, Harlan argued that regardless of the danger, “[w]hether or not this be wise 
legislation it is not the province of the court to inquire,” as “[the Court is] not to presume 
that the State of New York has acted in bad faith.” Id. at 69, 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 80. Id. at 64 (majority opinion). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Sunstein, supra note 77, at 878 n.28 (stating that during the Lochner era 
redistributive ends were not considered sufficiently public to justify government regulation). 
 83. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[A] constitution is not intended to embody a 
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to 
the State or of laissez faire.”). 
 84. See id. at 64 (majority opinion). 
 85. See id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating famously that “[t]he Fourteenth 
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics”). 
 86. Id.  
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social resources.”87  Thus Holmes’s and Peckham’s arguments in Lochner 
reveal diverging opinions on an issue that remains debated today:  whether 
it is legitimate for a government to act solely to advance the interests of a 
politically powerful group,88 or whether state legislation must contain an 
aspect of neutrality, thereby benefiting the general public at large.89 
2. Business Entry Cases Following Lochner 
Following its decision in Lochner, the Supreme Court declared it 
unconstitutional for states to pass legislation restricting access to a 
particular business.90  In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,91 the Court 
invalidated an Oklahoma law that required a license to sell ice.92  The state 
only granted licenses upon establishing that existing ice suppliers could not 
adequately meet supply.93  The Court stated that “a regulation which has the 
effect of denying or unreasonably curtailing the common right to engage in 
a lawful private business . . . cannot be upheld.”94  Justice Brandeis issued a 
famous dissent, accusing the majority of judicial overreaching and argued 
that states should be left as “laborator[ies]” able to “try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”95 
Similarly, in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,96 the Court struck down a 
law requiring that all owners of pharmacies, including corporate 
stockholders, be licensed pharmacists.97  Finding that “mere stock 
ownership in a corporation, owning and operating a drug store, can have no 
 
 87. Sunstein, supra note 77, at 879.  Sunstein further argues that “Holmes’ opinion treats 
the political process as a kind of civil war, in which the powerful succeed; if courts interfere, 
they will be bottling up forces that will express themselves elsewhere in other and more 
destructive forms.” Id. 
 88. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 748 (“The due process clause cannot 
logically prohibit legislatures from passing laws merely because powerful groups want and 
press for them.  Such an approach would ultimately prove counterproductive, for, if the 
courts prevent powerful groups from having their way in the legislative process, the political 
pressures will be bottled up and eventually emerge in even more destructive forms 
elsewhere.”); Richard A. Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential 
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 27 (arguing that most “public policies 
are better explained as the outcome of a pure power struggle—clothed in a rhetoric of public 
interest that is a mere figleaf—among narrow interest or pressure groups”). 
 89. See infra Part I.D.1. for a discussion of interest group theory. 
 90. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 619–20. 
 91. 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
 92. See id. at 278–80. 
 93. See id. at 271–72. 
 94. Id. at 278 (“[I]t is beyond the power of a state, ‘under the guise of protecting the 
public, arbitrarily [to] interfere with private business or prohibit lawful occupations or 
impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1924))). 
 95. New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“To stay experimentation 
in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.  Denial of the right to experiment 
may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory . . . .”). 
 96. 278 U.S. 105 (1928). 
 97. Id. at 108–09. 
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real or substantial relation to the public health,”98 the Court held that the 
law “deals in terms only with ownership.  [The law] plainly forbids the 
exercise of an ordinary property right and, on its face, denies what the 
Constitution guarantees.”99 
3.  The New Deal, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, and 
the Demise of Lochner 
Due to the economic and social upheaval during the Great Depression, by 
the mid-1930s, the Court was under “enormous pressures . . . to abandon 
the laissez-faire philosophy of the Lochner era,” as many viewed 
government economic regulation as essential to economic recovery.100  In 
response to the political climate, the Court began to overrule its previous 
decisions,101 and embraced a more expansive view of regulatory power, 
both under the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause.102 
Constitutional scholar Cass Sunstein suggests that by the time the Court 
reversed Lochner in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,103 the Court had 
changed its conception of what Sunstein identifies as the “baseline,” seeing 
the judicially enforced common law doctrines relating to the current 
distribution of property as just as much government action as state 
legislative enactments of hours and wages legislation.104  The argument 
goes that the Court saw the common law status quo as interfering with an 
individual’s ability to contract just as much as state legislation.105  The 
Court began viewing the baseline differently, believing it not to constitute 
illegitimate redistribution of property to pass laws that entitled everyone to 
fair wages and working conditions.106  Thus, the legislation would serve 
that public end by reining in abusive practices of employers, who were 
unfairly benefitting from the common law status quo.107  The West Coast 
Hotel decision rang the death knell for economic substantive due 
 
 98. Id. at 113. 
 99. Id. 
 100. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 621; LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 446–47 (1978) (“[I]t was the economic realities of the Depression 
that graphically undermined Lochner’s premises. . . .  The legal ‘freedom’ of contract and 
property came increasingly to be seen as an illusion . . . .  Positive government intervention 
came to be more widely accepted as essential to economic survival . . . .”). 
 101. See infra notes 103–09 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the factors that 
contributed to the famous “switch in time that saved nine,” see generally Farber, supra note 
40, at 987–95, and Mark Tushnet, The New Deal Constitutional Revolution:  Law, Politics, 
or What? 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (1999) (reviewing BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING 
THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998)). 
 102. See Farber, supra note 40, at 985. 
 103. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 104. See Sunstein, supra note 77, at 874–75. 
 105. See id. at 874. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 881 (“[D]epartures from [common law] baselines were no longer 
impermissibly partisan.”). 
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process;108 afterward, the Court was exceedingly deferential to legislative 
enactments.109 
There has been much disagreement in the academic literature about what 
was wrong with the Court’s decision in Lochner.110  In fact, some scholars 
argue that the Lochner Court was correct in “protecting freedom of contract 
as a basic aspect of liberty and in carefully scrutinizing laws regulating the 
economy.”111  However, West Coast Hotel did not change the majority’s 
position in Lochner that in order to be a legitimate exertion of the state’s 
police powers, the legislation must serve some neutral purpose112 directed 
at aiding the general welfare.113  The Court justified permitting the law at 
issue, which regulated the wages of working women, on the ground that 
without equalizing the bargaining field between employers and employees 
through legislation, poor working conditions might negatively impact the 
health and morals of women.114  Thus, the underlying purpose of the law 
aimed toward a public end. 
In Williamson v. Lee Optical,115 the Court took an even more deferential 
stance toward legislative economic enactments, finding an Oklahoma 
statute that prohibited an optician to fit or copy lenses without a 
prescription from an optometrist or an ophthalmologist to be 
constitutional.116  The Court, reversing the district court,117 reached its 
 
 108. See, e.g., Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process:  In Search of 
Constitutional Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 557 n.37 (1986). 
 109. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 624–25. 
 110. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 100, at 564 (arguing that while the Due Process Clause 
contains substantive protection for fundamental rights, “liberty of contract” was not one such 
right, and thus Lochner’s error “lay not in judicial intervention to protect ‘liberty’ but in a 
misguided understanding of what liberty actually required in the industrial age”); see also 
STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 744–47; cf. Charles Warren, The New “Liberty” Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 440 (1926) (arguing that the First Congress 
intended to import the English common law meaning of the word “liberty”—namely the 
“right to have one’s person free from physical restraint”—into the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause, and thus the clause does not protect substantive rights such as the right to 
contract). 
 111. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 11, at 621; see, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 128–29 (1985). See generally 
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2006). 
 112. The term “neutrality” is used by Sunstein to describe laws enacted to benefit the 
public generally, as opposed to laws that benefit particular partisan interest groups’ goals, 
which he calls “naked preferences.” See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the 
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1690 (1984); Sunstein, supra note 77, at 878. 
 113. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“The Constitution 
does not speak of freedom of contract.  It speaks of . . . liberty without due process of 
law. . . .  [T]he liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the 
protection of laws against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of 
the people.”). 
 114. See id. at 394 (“[Women’s] physical well being ‘becomes an object of public interest 
and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.’” (quoting Muller v. Oregon, 
208 U.S. 412 (1908))). 
 115. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 116. See id. at 486–91. 
 117. The district court had concluded that the regulation was irrational, since a new 
prescription was unnecessary when someone simply broke their glasses and needed a 
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decision by contemplating a set of hypothetical legitimate purposes that 
might have motivated the law in question.118 
However, the Court did not require the state to even argue these reasons 
to justify the law; rather, the Court supplied them itself.119  The Court made 
its deferential stance toward economic regulation clear when it stated that 
“[t]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause . . . to strike 
down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because 
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular 
school of thought.”120 
Similarly, the Court in Ferguson v. Skrupa121 declared constitutional a 
Kansas law that restricted debt adjusting to lawyers.122  The Court noted 
that “[t]here was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this 
Court to strike down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise 
or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy,”123 
but concluded that the doctrine “has long since been discarded.”124  Justice 
Black, writing for the majority, emphasized that “[u]nder the system of 
government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts, 
to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.”125  Thus the Court went 
even further than in Lee Optical, seemingly finding the law constitutional 
without any real inquiry into the means/end fit between the purpose and 
structure of the regulation.126 
Professor Chemerinsky has stated that the Kansas law was clearly an 
anticompetitive law aimed at protecting lawyers from competition in debt 
adjusting, in effect granting them a monopoly, and thus that “Ferguson 
shows that no longer did the Court interpret the due process clause to 
protect a right to practice a trade or profession or even freedom of 
contract.”127 
 
replacement. See id. at 485–86.  For a discussion of the district court’s opinion, see generally 
Randy E. Barnett, Keynote Remarks:  Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee Optical, 
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 845 (2012). 
 118. See Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487 (“The legislature might have concluded that the 
frequency of occasions when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this 
regulation of the fitting of eyeglasses. . . .  Or the legislature may have concluded that eye 
examinations were so critical, not only for correction of vision but also for the detection of 
latent ailments or diseases, that every change in frames and every duplication of a lens 
should be accompanied by a prescription from a medical expert.” (emphasis added)). 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. at 488. But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 626 (noting that “[i]n all 
likelihood, the Oklahoma law [in Lee Optical] was adopted to protect business for 
optometrists and ophthalmologists and was not motivated by a desire to improve health”). 
 121. 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
 122. Id. at 732–33. 
 123. Id. at 729. 
 124. Id. at 730. 
 125. Id. at 729. 
 126. See STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 758.  This deferential standard stems from the 
application of rational basis review to economic legislation. See infra Part I.C. 
 127. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 627. 
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C.  Current Equal Protection and Economic Substantive Due Process 
Analysis:  The Tripartite Framework and Resulting Deference 
to Economic Legislation  
The Equal Protection Clause, while often analyzed concurrently with the 
Due Process Clause, derives from a separate theoretical underpinning, and 
consequently requires separate discussion.128  This section first briefly 
discusses the history of the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
how the tripartite system of review is used to analyze legislation under the 
Equal Protection Clause.  This section then goes on to discuss the current 
rational basis standard as applied to economic regulations under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 
1.  Overview of the History and Purpose of the Equal Protection Clause 
and Its Application to Economic Regulations 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause states:  “No State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”129  The motivation behind the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause was “largely to protect the rights of the newly freed 
slaves” after the Civil War.130  Yet the Equal Protection Clause does more 
than just protect against racially drawn classifications that discriminate by 
treating people unequally based on racial characteristics.131  All legislative 
action involves classifying along some basis, resulting in unequal 
treatment.132  However, not all laws that classify individuals into different 
groups violate the Constitution.133  Otherwise, virtually all laws would be 
deemed unconstitutional violations of the Equal Protection Clause.134  
Thus, the challenge in equal protection jurisprudence is to determine which 
government classifications result in an unconstitutional deprivation of equal 
protection and which government classifications are permissible exercises 
of legislative authority.135 
Today, courts rarely invalidate state economic legislation under the rubric 
of equal protection or economic substantive due process analysis.136  Unlike 
 
 128. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 130. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 13. 
 131. See id. at 672. 
 132. For example, property owners are treated differently than nonproperty owners in 
paying property taxes, and children are treated differently than adults vis-à-vis voting rights.  
None of these classifications have been deemed violations of the Equal Protection Clause, 
even though they treat people differently as a result of the classification. 
 133. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (describing 
that the Equal Protection Clause “essentially [is] a direction that all persons similarly 
situated should be treated alike” (emphasis added)). 
 134. See id. at 439–40. 
 135. See infra Part I.C.2–3. 
 136. See STONE ET AL., supra note 18, at 758 (“[T]he Court has not invalidated an 
economic regulation on substantive due process grounds since 1937.”). But see infra note 
169 and accompanying text. 
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the realm of “implied fundamental rights,” where the Court has engaged in 
a more searching review using substantive due process analysis,137 the 
Court has been said to have abdicated its role of judicial review in the realm 
of economic regulations.138  Viewing this phenomenon as problematic, 
Professor Siegan favored elevating judicial review, arguing that the current 
deferential treatment of economic liberties violates separation of powers 
principals by closing off economic regulations entirely from meaningful 
review by the courts.139 
The Court, in its famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.,140 established that legislative classifications that regulate 
social and economic relationships will be viewed by courts with deference, 
with courts only applying searching judicial review when regulations 
infringe on a fundamental right or discriminate against “discrete and insular 
minorities.”141  The logic behind this formulation is that it allows the more 
democratically elected branches of government to make decisions without 
fear of the unelected judiciary second-guessing it, unless judicial scrutiny is 
warranted for some reason.142 
According to Professor Ackerman, Carolene Products “brilliantly 
endeavored to turn the Old Court’s recent defeat into a judicial victory.”143  
Since the era of judges imposing their own economic agenda had ended 
with West Coast Hotel, the Court, in an effort to rebuild their legitimacy, 
adopted the Carolene Products framework that largely deferred to the will 
of elected majorities.144  This solved what Professor Bickel identified as the 
countermajoritarian dilemma.145  To Bickel, “judicial review is a deviant 
 
 137. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding a fundamental right to 
engage in private consensual homosexual activity); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(finding that the fundamental right to privacy includes a woman’s decision to terminate her 
pregnancy prior to viability); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923) (finding a 
fundamental right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the 
education of their own”). 
 138. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 117, at 860 (“The modern rational basis approach 
adopted by the Warren Court in Lee Optical represents a judicial abdication of its function to 
police the Constitution’s limits on legislative power.”); Brandon S. Swider, Judicial Activism 
v. Judicial Abdication:  A Plea for a Return to the Lochner Era Substantive Due Process 
Methodology, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 315, 326–27 (2009). 
 139. See generally Bernard H. Siegan, Separation of Powers and Economic Liberties, 70 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 415 (1995). 
 140. 304 U.S. 144, 152, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
 141. Id. at 152–53 n.4.  The Court has subsequently characterized certain “liberty 
interests” as requiring elevated review. See Lucy E. Hill, Note, Seeking Liberty’s Refuge:  
Analyzing Legislative Purpose Under Casey’s Undue Burden Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 365, 370–73 (2012). 
 142. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 678–79. 
 143. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714 (1985). 
 144. See id. at 715. 
 145. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 18 (1962). 
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institution in the American democracy,”146 as it allows a few unelected 
judges to undo the laws passed by a democratically elected legislature.147 
2.  Rational Basis Review:  What Constitutes a 
Legitimate Government Purpose? 
Rational basis review is the lowest level of judicial review.148  Under the 
rational basis standard, a state must proffer a legitimate state interest, and 
the means employed through regulation to meet that interest must be 
rationally related.149  Legislation enjoys a presumption of validity, and the 
burden lies with the plaintiff to show that the law “does not rest upon any 
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.”150  This can be done in two 
ways:  (1) by showing that the law does not further a legitimate state 
purpose; or (2) by showing that the law could not rationally serve the 
legitimate state purpose.151 
The Court has made clear that the ends sought under traditional state 
police powers constitute legitimate state interests and are thus proper ends 
of government regulation.152  However, these are not the only goals or 
“ends” that states may legitimately regulate to advance.153  Rather, 
“[v]irtually any goal that is not forbidden by the Constitution will be 
deemed sufficient to meet the rational basis test.”154 
Nevertheless, the Court has found several illegitimate ends, including 
classifications which deprive individuals of their constitutional rights, for 
example their First Amendment rights, or laws which violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause by preferring in-state actors over out-of-state actors.155  
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id.; see also Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty:  
A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 
1287, 1290–92 (2004). 
 148. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 672–73. 
 149. See id. at 672. 
 150. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78–79 (1911); see also 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (“State legislatures are presumed to 
have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result 
in some inequality.  A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts 
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”). 
 151. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 678. 
 152. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 680–81 (citing Ry. Express Agency v. New 
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (public safety); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) 
(public health); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (public morals)). But see 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (finding a moral justification insufficient as 
Colorado’s Amendment 2 aimed at the illegitimate purpose of singling out an unpopular 
group and denying that group fair access to the political process). 
 153. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 681 (“Public safety, public health, and public 
morals are legitimate government purposes, but they are not the only ones.”). 
 154. See id. at 681 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Public safety, 
public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order, these are some of the more 
conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs.  
Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it.”)). 
 155. See id. at 682. 
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Furthermore, in Romer v. Evans,156 the Court struck down a law while 
purporting to be engaged in rational basis review.157  The Court in Romer 
cited Department of Agriculture v. Moreno158 for the proposition that “a 
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.”159 
The plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that the state’s interest is not 
legitimate.160  This is a high burden since, as the Court emphasized in FCC 
v. Beach Communications, Inc., the actual purpose behind the statute is 
“entirely irrelevant” and any “conceiv[able] reason for the challenged 
distinction” will be enough to uphold the legislation.161  Furthermore, this 
distinction does not need to rest on any empirical evidence, but can be 
proved based on “rational speculation.”162  This leaves plaintiffs 
challenging a law with the “burden ‘to negat[e] every conceivable basis 
which might support it,’”163 which some scholars have decried as an 
impossible task.164 
3.  Rational Basis Review:  What Constitutes a Reasonable Relationship? 
Whether the law is rationally related to the legitimate end is “the most 
relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny.”165  The only limitation is 
that the law cannot be “clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an 
exercise of judgment.”166  This means that rational basis allows both 
underinclusive and overinclusive laws.167 
This loose fit between ends and means has been criticized by 
commentators who view courts’ acceptance of such a loose connection to 
amount to judicial abdication. Steven M. Simpson, a senior attorney at the 
Institute for Justice, has argued that: 
[a]t a sufficient level of generality, any statutory scheme can be said to 
serve a state purpose.  But reciting a tautology is not the same thing as 
examining whether a particular legislative choice is within the bounds of 
 
 156. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 157. See id.  This type of heightened review has been deemed rational basis review “with 
bite.” See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 680. 
 158. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 159. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). 
 160. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (citation omitted). 
 164. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age:  Why 
Yesterday’s Rationality Review Isn’t Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 457, 500–01 (2004). 
 165. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989). 
 166. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 
U.S. 619, 640 (1937)). 
 167. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 686 (explaining that underinclusive laws are 
often indicators that the law is either being used to harm a particular group, or to help a 
politically powerful group). 
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its constitutional authority.  It is little more than a rationalization for 
government action dressed up as judicial review.168 
Regardless of the scholarly criticism, instances of the Court finding laws 
irrational are few and far between.169  Part II of this Note discusses the 
diverging treatment of the question of what constitutes unconstitutional 
“arbitrary” power. 
D.  Pluralist Theory, Interest Group Theory, and the FTC’s Funeral Rule 
This section briefly explains pluralist theory and interest group theory.  
This explanation is necessary for a full discussion of the regulations that 
limit casket sales to funeral home directors, due to the arguments that the 
casket sales restrictions are illegitimate as they are wholly the product of 
powerful interest group pressures.  However this discussion will necessarily 
be limited, as it is outside the scope of this Note to provide a complete 
survey of these theories.  This section concludes with a brief overview of 
the funeral industry and a discussion of the FTC’s Funeral Rule. 
1. Interest Group Pluralism and Public Choice Theory 
Pluralist theory views interest group participation as an essential element 
of the proper functioning of a democracy.170  As far back as de 
Tocqueville’s writings on the importance of “factions,” interest group 
pluralism has been embraced as necessary in a democracy.171  Pluralists 
embrace self-interested special interest groups’ participation in government 
and view regulation of interest groups as a threat to proper democratic 
process by distorting the marketplace for private political activity.172  
Pluralists believe that interest group participation should be left 
unregulated, embracing an “invisible hand” approach, which posits that the 
best results ensue when interest groups advocate freely.173 
In contrast with the pluralists’ optimistic view of interest group 
participation,174 public choice theorists take a more sinister view of public 
 
 168. Steven M. Simpson, Judicial Abdication and the Rise of Special Interests, 6 CHAP. L. 
REV. 173, 191 (2003). 
 169. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 687–89 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)); Sunstein, supra note 112, at 1698. But see Brief for 
Petitioners-Appellees at 26–27 & nn.13–14, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756 (5th 
Cir. Dec. 12, 2011) (collecting cases where laws have been struck down under rational basis 
review). 
 170. See Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust:  A Modern 
Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 937–42 (1990). 
 171. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 
29 (1985); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Pluralist Theory of the Equal Protection 
Clause, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1239, 1239 (2009) (arguing that the Constitution is grounded 
in the normative theory of pluralism). 
 172. See Minda, supra note 170, at 939 & n.113 (citing Sunstein, supra note 171, at 33). 
 173. See id. at 938–39 (citing Sunstein, supra note 171, at 34). 
 174. See id. at 937 (noting the “optimistic[]” conception of politics that pluralism 
provided in the 1960s). 
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interest groups.175  Borrowing tools from economics and applying them to 
lawmaking, public choice theory’s tenants of interest group theory and rent 
seeking reject the presumption that legislatures act to serve the general 
public.176  Interest group theory posits that small, organized groups gain 
disproportionate177 power in government, resulting in regulations that do 
not advance the public interest, but rather extract “monopoly rents” from 
interest groups for the right to operate a monopoly that harms the public, 
often through higher prices.178  Small, extremely interested groups gain 
disproportionate benefits compared to the large majorities with diffusely 
held interests, due to lowered transaction costs, such as lower costs in 
policing free riding and receiving larger benefits if successful.179  Interest 
group theory thus explains why regulations often do not mirror the interests 
of majorities.180 
Using interest group theory as a tool, some scholars have advocated 
elevating judicial review of economic regulations that are products of 
interest group lobbying.181  This reflects the notion that the political process 
is broken due to the presence of interest groups, and that judges must 
interfere to ensure that laws are passed to advance the public interest.182 
This urge to ratchet up judicial scrutiny is not without critics, however.183  
For example, Professor Elhauge argues that, absent some normative 
evaluation of the outcomes of special interest legislation, interest group 
theory cannot show that the political process is defective.184  This is 
because, “[w]hether courts will find any given level of [interest group] 
influence excessive depends upon the normative baseline they use.”185  Put 
differently, without attaching a baseline level of what the “appropriate” 
amount of influence a particular group should yield, it is impossible to 
determine whether the outcome is “inappropriate” or not.186  As Elhauge 
points out, a baseline of efficiency is often implicitly adopted, but using 
interest group theory to attain the realization that a particular regulation is 
 
 175. Id. at 945. 
 176. See Ezra B. Hood, Comment, Interpreting in the Public Interest:  How Macey’s 
Canon Can Restore Economic Liberty, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 441, 450 (2009). 
 177. But see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Instrusive 
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 49–60 (1991) (arguing that finding a particular group’s 
influence disproportionate requires adopting some normative baseline for determining what 
that group’s proportionate influence should be); see also infra notes 184–87 and 
accompanying text. 
 178. See Elhauge, supra note 177, at 32; Hood, supra note 176, at 453–54, 461. 
 179. See Elhauge, supra note 177, at 36–37; Hood, supra, note 176, at 450. 
 180. See Elhauge, supra note 177, at 32. 
 181. See id. at 32–33 (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Frank Easterbrook, Richard Epstein, 
William Eskridge, Jonathan Macey, Jerry Mashaw, Gary Minda, William Page, Martin 
Shapiro, Bernard Siegan, Cass Sunstein, and John Wiley as proponents of a less deferential 
form of judicial review). 
 182. See id. 
 183. See generally id. 
 184. See id. at 48–61. 
 185. Id. at 60. 
 186. See id. at 60–63. 
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inefficient adds nothing additional to the analysis that a mere evaluation of 
the efficiency of the regulation could not illustrate.187 
2.  Overview of the Funeral Industry and the FTC’s Funeral Rule 
To illustrate the effects of the restrictive casket-sales regulations at issue 
in this Note, this subsection embarks on a brief discussion of the high costs 
of a funeral and the FTC’s efforts to keep those costs low through its 
Funeral Rule. 
Other than buying a house or a car, arranging a funeral is the most 
expensive purchase for many Americans.188  A traditional funeral in the 
United States, including a casket and vault, costs about $6,000, not 
including extras such as flowers and limousines that can add thousands 
more to the bottom line, sometimes with the total escalating to $10,000.189  
The average casket, usually constructed of metal, wood, fiberboard, 
fiberglass, or plastic, costs around $2,000, while some mahogany, bronze, 
or copper caskets can cost up to $10,000.190  With over two million funerals 
a year nationwide,191 funeral preparation is a multibillion dollar industry.192 
In the 1980s, the FTC promulgated regulations for consumer protection 
against unfair and deceptive practices in the funeral industry.193  Known as 
the Funeral Rule, the FTC regulations require price lists to be distributed to 
consumers in an effort to create transparency in pricing and to prevent 
abusive “bundling” of products and services within the industry.194  The 
Funeral Rule contemplates casket sales by nonfuneral provider195 third-
party sellers.196  In 1994, the FTC amended the Funeral Rule to expressly 
disallow the charging of casket handling fees when consumers opted to 
 
 187. See id. at 54–55.  Elhauge uses this same analysis to conclude that using antitrust 
capture theory to justify more searching judicial review is similarly flawed. See id. at 46–47. 
 188. See FTC Funeral Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 42,260, 42,260 (Sept. 24, 1982) (codified as 
amended at 16 C.F.R. pt. 453). See generally, Asheesh Agarwal & Jerry Ellig, Buried 
Online:  State Laws That Limit E-commerce in Caskets, 14 ELDER L.J. 283 (2006) (detailing 
the funeral industry as it existed in 2006). 
 189. See Funerals:  A Consumer Guide, FTC (June 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
edu/pubs/consumer/products/pro19.shtm. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id.; see also Deaths and Morality, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2012) 
(stating that there were 2,437,163 deaths in 2009). 
 192. Statistics, NAT’L FUNERAL DIRECTORS ASS’N, http://www.nfda.org/media-
center/statisticsreports.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (stating that funeral arranging and 
cremation was a $11.95 billion dollar industry in 2007). 
 193. See 16 C.F.R. § 453.1–.9 (2012). 
 194. See FTC Funeral Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,260, 42,269, 42,281 (Sept. 24, 1982) 
(codified as amended at 16 C.F.R. pt. 453). 
 195. The Funeral Rule defines “funeral provider” as “any person, partnership or 
corporation that sells or offers to sell funeral goods and funeral services to the public.” 16 
C.F.R. § 453.1(i) (emphasis added). 
 196. See Brief for the FTC As Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 6–7 & n.9, St. 
Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2011) (citing 16 C.F.R. 
§ 453.2(b)(D)(1)). 
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purchase caskets from third-party sellers.197  By eliminating such fees, the 
FTC aimed to foster a more competitive environment whereby consumers 
would not be deterred from purchasing caskets through independent third-
party retailers by the imposition of excessive handling fees.198  
Acknowledging that third-party sellers pose a substantially lesser threat to 
competition, in 2008, the FTC declined to extend the coverage of the 
Funeral Rule to third-party casket and urn sellers, concluding that the lack 
of abuses by such sellers rendered the imposition of the rule unnecessary.199 
II.  THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER CASKET-SALE RESTRICTIONS:  
IS ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM A LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST? 
Part I discussed the history of substantive due process and equal 
protection jurisprudence and showed how under rational basis review, most 
economic regulations are upheld.  Part II examines the casket sales 
restriction cases that bring to the forefront the current circuit split over 
whether intrastate economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest.  Part 
II.A discusses the arguments employed by courts that have upheld the 
constitutionality of the funeral home regulations by finding them rationally 
related to legitimate state interests other than pure intrastate economic 
protectionism.  Part II.B discusses the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Craigmiles 
v. Giles,200 which held that intrastate economic protectionism is not a 
legitimate state interest, before turning to the Fifth Circuit’s recent 
treatment of the issue in St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille.201  Part II.C analyzes 
the arguments presented by the Tenth Circuit in Powers v. Harris,202 which 
led to its conclusion that intrastate economic protectionism constitutes a 
legitimate state interest.203 
 
 197. See 1994 FTC Funeral Rule Amendment, 59 Fed. Reg. 1592 (Jan. 11, 1994) 
(amending 16 C.F.R. pt. 453).  Both the originally promulgated Funeral Rule and the 
subsequent amendments withstood legal challenge on various grounds by funeral operators. 
See Pa. Funeral Dirs. Ass’n v. FTC, 41 F.3d 81 (3d Cir. 1994); Harry & Bryant Co. v. FTC, 
726 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 198. See 1994 FTC Funeral Rule Amendment, 59 Fed. Reg. at 1593. But see Judith A. 
Chevalier & Fiona M. Scott Morton, State Casket Sales Restrictions:  A Pointless 
Undertaking?, 51 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2008) (producing a study suggesting a “one-monopoly-
rent” hypothesis to explain funeral goods and services, whereby when competition emerges 
among casket sellers, the cost of other funeral services rises, leaving no economic savings 
for consumers). 
 199. See 2008 FTC Funeral Rule Amendment, 73 Fed. Reg. 13,740, 13,742 (Mar. 14, 
2008) (amending 16 C.F.R. pt. 453) (finding “insufficient evidence that . . . third-party 
sellers of funeral goods are engaged in widespread unfair or deceptive acts or practices”). 
 200. 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 201. No. 11-30756, 2012 WL 5207465 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 2012). 
 202. 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004), cert denied, 554 U.S. 920 (2005). 
 203. This Note centers on the casket-sales regulations to examine the issue of whether 
economic protectionism of an intrastate industry is a legitimate state interest.  While courts 
have discussed this issue in other regulatory contexts, most notably the Ninth Circuit in 
Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 992 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that “economic 
protectionism for its own sake, regardless of its relation to the common good, cannot be said 
to be in furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest”), discussion of such cases is 
outside the scope of this Note. 
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A.  Legitimate State Interests Other Than Intrastate 
Economic Protectionism Employed To Uphold the Constitutionality of 
the Casket-Sales Regulations 
Before embarking on an analysis of the arguments concerning the 
primary question addressed in this Note, namely, whether legislating with 
the purpose of protecting an in-state industry from competition represents a 
legitimate exercise of the states’ police powers, it is important to discuss the 
arguments employed by courts that have upheld the regulations without 
reaching this central question.  These decisions relied on finding the 
regulations rationally related to other legitimate state interests besides 
intrastate economic protectionism, therefore supporting the conclusion of 
constitutionality, such as the state’s interest in protecting the health and 
safety of its citizens and the state’s interest in consumer protection.204  
While all of the cases addressed in this Note concede that consumer 
protection and promoting health and safety are legitimate state interests,205 
the following courts relied on those state interests to uphold the laws.  In 
contrast, the courts discussed in Part II.B and II.C of this Note relied on the 
state interest in economic protectionism to either uphold or strike down the 
regulations.206 
Some courts have used the states’ general interest in regulating the 
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens to uphold the constitutionality of 
the funeral merchandise regulations, by finding the regulations rationally 
related to that end.  In Guardian Plans Inc. v. Teague,207 for example, the 
Fourth Circuit upheld a Virginia funeral-licensing scheme as 
constitutionally promoting the legitimate state interest of public health and 
safety.208 
The Virginia regulation at issue limited the making of funeral 
arrangements, including selling supplies, to those licensed by the state in 
the funeral service profession.209  The plaintiffs challenged the Virginia 
 
 204. See, e.g., Guardian Plans Inc. v. Teague, 870 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1989) (public health 
and safety); N.C. Bd. of Mortuary Sci. v. Crown Mem’l Park, L.L.C., 590 S.E.2d 467, 471 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that “seeking to protect pre-need consumer funds for funeral 
merchandise is a legitimate interest” and that the North Carolina pre-need casket sales 
regulation rationally related to that interest); State Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral Dirs. v. 
Stone Casket Co., 976 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998) (same). 
 205. See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 662 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (noting 
that both protecting the funeral consumer and protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the 
public “are clearly legitimate governmental interests”). 
 206. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 207. 870 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 208. Id. at 126–27. 
 209. See id. at 125 (“[Practice of Funeral Services] shall also mean the engagement of 
making arrangements for funeral service, selling funeral supplies to the public or making 
financial arrangements for the rendering of such services or the sale of such supplies.” 
(emphasis omitted) (citing VA. CODE ANN. 54-260.67(2))).  The statute today reads: 
“Practice of funeral services” means engaging in the care and disposition of the 
human dead, the preparation of the human dead for the funeral service, burial or 
cremation, the making of arrangements for the funeral service or for the financing 
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regulation as unconstitutional on vagueness, due process, and equal 
protection grounds.210  In its equal protection and due process analysis, the 
Teague court did not reach the question of whether economic protectionism 
can be a legitimate state interest.  Rather, the appellants conceded that the 
Virginia legislature’s interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of 
its citizens by regulating the funeral home industry is “well recognized.”211 
Thus, the Court found that the legislature could have “rationally determined 
that keeping the arrangement of funerals in the hands of licensed funeral 
professionals would benefit the public by ensuring competence in funeral 
arrangement.”212 
The appellants had argued that it is “ludicrous to require a salesperson, 
who does nothing more than make preneed arrangements, to have the same 
credentials as a full-fledged funeral director.”213  The appellants had further 
argued that proof of the irrationality of the regulation was imbued in the 
fact that although the regulation was designed to protect consumers, it was 
in fact anti-consumer by “restricting consumer choice in this traditionally 
anti-competitive market.”214  The Fourth Circuit rejected appellants’ 
arguments, classifying them as mere disagreement with the legislature’s 
“judgment in refusing to establish different licensure requirements for 
persons who do nothing more than arrange funerals,”215 which the Supreme 
Court has rejected with regard to other professions.216  The Fourth Circuit 
concluded that “[o]ur inquiry ends here.  The wisdom of [the licensure 
requirements] is simply irrelevant.”217  Thus, the Fourth Circuit deferred to 
the state’s judgment regarding the best means to achieve its interest in 
public health and safety.  Moreover, the court did not embark on a 
searching review of those means, instead finding the arguably loose “fit” 
between the ends and means of the regulation sufficient to pass 
constitutional muster.218 
 
of the funeral service and the selling or making of financial arrangements for the 
sale of funeral supplies to the public. 
 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2800 (2011). 
 210. See Teague, 870 F.2d at 125. 
 211. Id. at 126. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See id.  Teague cites Lee Optical as “uph[olding] requirement that only a licensed 
optometrist or ophthalmologist may refit old lenses into new frames”; England v. Louisiana 
State Board of Medical Examiners, 246 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. La. 1965), aff’d, 384 U.S. 885 
(1966), as “uph[olding] requirement that chiropractors must have a full medical license”; and 
Sutker v. Illinois State Dental Society, 808 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1986), as “uph[olding] 
requirement that only licensed dentists could fit dentures.” See Teague, 870 F.2d at 126. 
 217. Teague, 870 F.2d at 126. 
 218. But see Brief for Petitioners-Appellees at 34–35 & n.21, St. Joseph Abbey v. 
Castille, No. 11-30756 (5th Cir. Dec. 12, 2011) (distinguishing Teague as involving funeral 
arranging on a pre-need basis, and including complex financial transactions such as holding 
money in trust). 
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Similarly, in State Board of Embalmers & Funeral Directors v. Stone 
Casket Co.,219 an Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed a due process 
and equal protection challenge to Oklahoma’s funeral licensing scheme by 
finding the regulation rationally related to the legitimate state interest of 
regulating health and safety.220  The court in Stone Casket reached this 
conclusion by finding that Oklahoma had a legitimate interest in regulating 
funeral services, since funeral services are related to the preparation and 
disposal of human remains, and “[s]uch laws protect the public health and 
safety of the citizens of Oklahoma.”221  The court also found that “[c]askets 
are directly involved in the burial of human remains,”222 thus also 
promoting the health and safety of the citizens of the state.  The court 
upheld the requirement that casket sellers be licensed by the state, reasoning 
that “[a] casket is a part of the funeral service business and cannot be 
separated as an independent item.”223  The court found that the state had the 
legitimate power to protect the health and safety of its citizens and further 
found the funeral regulations to be rationally related to that end by 
promoting sanitation.224  Notably, the court focused on the state’s power to 
regulate the funeral industry generally, and then accorded the state 
deference to their means of doing so, and thus endorsed limiting casket 
sales to those licensed by the state.225 
B.  Courts Finding That Pure Economic Protectionism Is Not a 
Legitimate State Interest 
This section centers on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Craigmiles, which 
struck down Tennessee’s regulation limiting the sales of caskets to funeral 
directors under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.  This section 
also discusses the Fifth Circuit’s recent treatment of these similar 
regulations in St. Joseph Abbey.  
1.  Sixth Circuit:  Craigmiles v. Giles 
Craigmiles involved a due process and equal protection challenge226 to 
the Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act (FDEA).  The FDEA 
 
 219. 976 P.2d 1074 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998). 
 220. See id. at 1076.  This case involved a challenge in state court to the same regulations 
(OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 396.1. (2011)) later adjudicated in federal court in Powers. See supra 
Part II.C. 
 221. Stone Casket, 976 P.2d at 1076. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. 
 225. See id. (“[W]e hold that the manufacture and sale of caskets is part and parcel of the 
funeral service business, and regulating that business and licensing qualified persons 
engaged therein is a proper exercise of the police power of the State . . . .”). 
 226. The plaintiffs also argued that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002).  
Unlike the district court, which rejected the argument, the Tenth Circuit failed to reach the 
issue, simply noting that the clause has been largely dormant since the Slaughter-House 
Cases. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004). But see Saenz v. Roe, 
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was originally passed in 1951, but was amended in 1972 by the Tennessee 
General Assembly to include the retailing of funeral merchandise in the 
definition of “funeral directing.”227  The statute required228 those engaged 
in funeral directing to either complete one year of course work at an 
accredited mortuary school and a one-year apprenticeship with a licensed 
funeral director, or to do a full two-year apprenticeship.229  The required 
coursework at the only mortuary school in Tennessee included “eight credit 
hours in embalming, three in ‘restorative art,’ and twenty-one in ‘funeral 
service.’”230  In addition, one was required to pass the Tennessee Funeral 
Arts Examination.231 
The plaintiffs were engaged in the business of selling caskets and other 
funeral merchandise through two independent retail stores located in 
Tennessee.232  The Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers issued a 
cease and desist letter, demanding that the plaintiffs stop selling caskets and 
other funeral merchandise.233  The Board declared that the plaintiffs were 
engaged in “funeral directing” by selling such merchandise and argued that 
since the plaintiffs were not licensed funeral directors, they had violated the 
FDEA.234  Both stores subsequently ceased operations.235 
The plaintiffs sued in the Eastern District of Tennessee, seeking an 
injunction against the enforcement of the FDEA against those businesses 
only selling funeral merchandise.236  The court held that the FDEA, as 
applied to the plaintiffs’ businesses, violated equal protection and due 
process.237  After enjoining the enforcement of the FDEA as applied to the 
plaintiffs, the plaintiffs resumed the operation of their businesses.238 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision, applying rational basis to review 
the constitutionality of the FDEA under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses, as the parties had conceded that this was the correct 
 
526 U.S. 489, 501–04 (1999) (using the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect the right 
of citizens to travel across state lines); id. at 527–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (indicating a 
willingness to reexamine the Privileges or Immunities Clause in a future case through the 
lens of original intent). 
 227. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222 (citing TENN. CODE. ANN. § 62-5-101(6)(A)(ii) 
which stated that “funeral directing” consisted of the “[m]aking of arrangements to provide 
for funeral services, the selling of funeral merchandise, the making of financial arrangements 
for the rendering of the services, [and/or] the sale of such merchandise.”). 
 228. The statute was amended in 2010 following the Sixth Circuit’s disposition of this 
case. 
 229. See id. (quoting TENN. CODE. ANN. § 62-5-101(a)(3)(A)(ii) (1997)). 
 230. See id. 
 231. See id. 
 232. Id. at 222–23. 
 233. Id. at 223. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 667 (E.D. Tenn. 2000). 
 238. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 223. 
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level of review for an economic regulation.239  The court noted that, 
regardless of the strong presumption under the rational basis standard that 
the law was legitimate, the district court had found that the regulation was 
not rationally related to a governmental purpose, as the district court 
believed that the law “was designed only for the economic protection of 
funeral home operators.”240  Citing the classic Dormant Commerce Clause 
decision of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey241 for the proposition that 
“[c]ourts have repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete interest 
group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental 
purpose,”242 the court rejected out of hand the argument that economic 
protectionism can be a legitimate state interest.243 
The State did not offer pure economic protectionism of the funeral 
directors as the objective of its law; rather, the court read between the lines, 
concluding that the state’s proffered justifications were so weak244 that the 
law must have been motivated by an attempt to isolate the funeral home 
industry from competition:245  “we are left with the . . . obvious illegitimate 
purpose to which the licensure provision is very well tailored.”246  The 
court felt that “Tennessee’s justifications for the 1972 amendment [came] 
close to striking us with ‘the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead 
fish,’ a level of pungence almost required to invalidate a statute under 
rational basis review.”247  The court noted that while “[o]nly a handful of 
provisions have been invalidated for failing rational basis review. . . . [t]his 
case should be among [that] handful.”248  Thus the court inquired into the 
real motivation behind the regulation, and, finding it motivated by 
protecting special interests, equated such motivation with the motivation 
discovered by the Court in Romer and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center249:  that of “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group.”250 
 
 239. Id. at 224 (“While feared by many, morticians and casket retailers have not achieved 
the protected status that requires a higher level of scrutiny under our Equal Protection 
jurisprudence.  Although the licensing requirement has disrupted the plaintiffs’ businesses, 
the regulations do not affect any right now considered fundamental and thus requiring more 
significant justification.”). 
 240. Id. 
 241. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
 242. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224 (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 
525 (1949), and Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 
(1983)). 
 243. See id. at 224–25. 
 244. See infra notes 251–63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state’s 
proffered purposes. 
 245. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225. 
 246. Id. at 228. 
 247. Id. at 225 (quoting United States v. Searan, 259 F.3d 434, 447 (6th Cir. 2001)) 
(citations omitted). 
 248. Id. at 225. 
 249. 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
 250. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 
225. 
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The court proceeded to analyze whether the FDEA bore a rational 
relationship to any legitimate government purpose other than protecting the 
funeral director’s economic interests.251  The State proffered two 
governmental interests as the purpose of the law:  (1) promoting health and 
safety and (2) consumer protection.252  The court examined both 
justifications and found the regulation not rationally related to either end.253 
With respect to the health and safety rationale, the court conceded that 
the quality of a casket has the potential to impact public health in that leaky 
caskets could potentially cause substances to contaminate ground water and 
harm the public.254  However, the court rejected this rationale after finding 
that the state does not regulate the particular types of permissible casket 
designs, and in fact does not require that a casket be used at all.255  The 
Sixth Circuit noted that “[t]he district court determined that there was no 
evidence of any public safety risk from a leaky casket, or mere ‘box’ for 
human remains.”256  Thus, the court concluded that any regulation 
restricting casket sales to funeral home operators was not rationally related 
to protecting the public welfare.257  In fact, the court suggested that the 
regulations restricting casket sales might actually decrease public health and 
safety, since restricting competition in the casket market generally drives up 
prices, making the more protective caskets potentially unaffordable and 
leading to consumer purchases of lesser quality caskets.258 
The State also argued that the regulation was needed in order to protect 
consumers, since the FDEA regulates the conduct of funeral directors by 
“preventing them from making fraudulent misrepresentations, making 
solicitations after death or when death is imminent, or selling a previously 
used casket.”259  The state argued that if casket sellers are not licensed 
funeral directors, then the state cannot prevent them from engaging in these 
types of behaviors.260  The court rejected this argument, stating that the Act 
 
 251. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See id. at 226. 
 254. See id. at 225.  In Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi, 124 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D. Miss. 
2000), the State argued along similar lines that the Mississippi funeral licensing scheme 
promoted the prompt disposition of human remains.  The court ultimately rejected this 
argument. Id. at 438. 
 255. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225; see also Casket Royale, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 439 
(rejecting a consumer protection argument where “the Mississippi legislature has not seen fit 
to prescribe guidelines for the quality of caskets”). 
 256. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 226 (citing Craigmiles v. Giles, 100 F. Supp. 2d 658, 662–
63 (E.D. Tenn. 2000)).  Thus the Craigmiles court diverged from the courts cited in Part II.A 
supra, which found similar regulations to be rationally related to the promotion of public 
health and safety. 
 257. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 226. 
 258. See id.; see also Casket Royale, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 440 (“As a result of [the 
restriction of casket sales], consumers in Mississippi are offered fewer choices when it 
comes to selecting a casket . . . one is forced to pay higher prices in a far less competitive 
environment.”). 
 259. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 226 (citing TENN. CODE. ANN. § 62-5-317(a)(2)). 
 260. Id. 
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already applies generally to casket retailers and, even if it did not, the State 
could easily pass or amend legislation making the regulations apply to 
casket retailers as well.261  The court also rejected the similar argument that 
the licensing was required in order to ensure compliance with the FTC 
Funeral Rule, noting that the Funeral Rule is already generally applicable to 
casket retailers262 and, furthermore, independent casket retailers generally 
have the effect of stimulating competition and promoting transparency of 
pricing—central policies that the FTC Funeral Rule was designed to 
promote.263 
Departing from the usual level of deference prescribed for rational basis 
review, the court infused its discussion of consumer protection with an 
analysis of something that is usually reserved for a higher level of 
scrutiny—whether there are less restrictive alternatives to achieve the same 
legislative result.264  The court wrote that “[i]f consumer protection were 
the aim of the 1972 Amendment, the General Assembly had several direct 
means of achieving that end.”265  In doing so, the court diverged in its 
conception of the degree to which the statute can only incidentally relate to 
the legitimate end.266  Seeing the “pretextual” nature of the legislature’s 
proffered justifications, the court preemptively defended a foreseeable 
argument of “Lochnering”:  “We are not imposing our view of a well-
functioning market on the people of Tennessee.  Instead, we invalidate only 
the General Assembly’s naked attempt to raise a fortress protecting the 
monopoly rents that funeral directors extract from consumers.”267  Thus the 
court found the law not aimed at a legitimate end, and therefore unable to 
withstand its more searching variant of rational basis review.268 
2.  Fifth Circuit:  St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille 
Very recently in St. Joseph Abbey, the Fifth Circuit confronted due 
process and equal protection challenges to restrictive casket-sales 
regulations.269  Preceding the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, the Eastern District of 
Louisiana permanently enjoined Louisiana from enforcing its Embalming 
and Funeral Directors Act.270  Unlike Powers, where the court sua sponte 
 
 261. Id. 
 262. See id. at 227 (noting that the FTC Funeral Rule already applies to “any person, 
partnership, or corporation that sells or offers to sell funeral goods or funeral service to the 
public.” (emphasis added) (quoting C.F.R. § 453.1(i))). 
 263. See id. See generally FTC Funeral Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 42,260 (Sept. 24, 1982) 
(codified as amended at 16 C.F.R. pt. 453) (detailing the purpose of the FTC Funeral Rule). 
 264. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228. 
 265. Id. 
 266. But cf. Guardian Plans Inc. v. Teague, 870 F.2d 123, 126 (1989) (quoting 
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955)). 
 267. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 229. 
 268. Id. 
 269. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756, 2012 WL 5207465 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 
2012). 
 270. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d 149, 160–61 (E.D. La. 2011); see 
also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:831 (West 2012).  Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, there 
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tackled the argument that economic protectionism could constitute a 
legitimate state interest, in St. Joseph Abbey, the State advanced both 
consumer protection and economic protectionism as potential legitimate 
state interests.271  In addressing the question of whether economic 
protectionism can constitute a legitimate state interest, the court tracked the 
arguments advanced by the Craigmiles court, as well as the Powers 
concurrence, and rejected those arguments.272 
The Fifth Circuit, however, punted273 on the constitutional questions by 
citing the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to defer ruling and instead 
certified an issue of state law to the Louisiana Supreme Court.274  The 
question posed to the supreme court was whether the Louisiana State Board 
of Embalmers and Funeral Directors had statutory authority under state law 
to regulate the selling of caskets by those unrelated to the funeral 
industry.275 
Despite the fact that the constitutional questions were not reached, the 
decision delved substantively into the constitutional arguments.276  Such an 
approach indicates that if the Louisiana Supreme Court finds statutory 
support for the Board’s ability to regulate the use of caskets by those not 
otherwise connected to the funeral industry, the Fifth Circuit will likely 
strike down the regulations on constitutional grounds.277 
This is evidenced in the Fifth Circuit’s language of “doubt”278:  the court 
“doubt[ed]”279 that the Louisiana regulations were rationally related to 
either consumer protection280 or health and safety281 justifications.  As to 
 
were two legislative attempts, in 2008 and 2010, to exempt the plaintiff monks from the 
casket sale restrictions, both of which were defeated by funeral directors and industry 
lobbyists. See Ramon Antonio Vargas, Monks Sue To Build, Sell Caskets, HOUS. CHRON. 
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.chron.com/life/houston-belief/article/Monks-sue-to-build-sell-
caskets-1709363.php. 
 271. See St. Joseph Abbey, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 151–52. 
 272. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 10-2717, 2011 WL 1361425 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 
2011) (denying motion to dismiss).  For a similar case, see Peachtree Caskets Direct, Inc. v. 
State Board of Funeral Service of Georgia, No. Civ.1:98-CV-3084, 1999 WL 33651794, at 
*1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 1999). 
 273. Debra Cassens Weiss, 5th Circuit Appears To Favor Monks Challenging Casket 
Restrictions, But Punts Issue to La. Supremes, ABA J. (Oct. 23, 2012, 5:30 AM), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/5th_circuit_certifies_casket_sale_question_to_louisiana_
supreme_court/. 
 274. St. Joseph Abbey, 2011 WL 1361425, at *9. 
 275. Id. at *11. 
 276. For this reason, Judge Haynes issued a concurrence, believing it unnecessary to 
discuss the constitutional issues beyond “not[ing] that there are substantial federal 
constitutional questions presented.” Id. (Haynes, J., concurring).  
 277. Id. at *3 (“After examining the record, we have doubts about the constitutionality of 
the State Board’s regulation of intrastate casket sales.”); see Sam Favate, Fifth Circuit:  
Louisiana Rule on Casket Sales “Must Not Be Irrational,” WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Oct. 24, 
2012, 12:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/10/24/fifth-circuit-louisiana-rule-on-casket-
sales-must-not-be-irrational/ (noting the Fifth Circuit “criticized the regulation”). 
 278. St. Joseph Abbey, 2011 WL 1361425, at *3. 
 279. Id. at *6, *8. 
 280. Id. at *5–7. 
 281. Id. at *7–8. 
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the health and safety justification, the court noted how the State does not 
require the use of a particular type of casket, that caskets be sealed, or even 
the use of a casket at all at burial, thus negating the argument that the 
regulation is rationally related to aiding public health.282 
Most notably for purposes of this Note, the Fifth Circuit sided with the 
Craigmiles court on the issue of economic favoritism, writing in dicta that 
“neither precedent nor broader principles suggest that mere economic 
protection of a pet industry is a legitimate governmental purpose.”283  
However, the court noted that “economic protection, that is favoritism, . . . 
[if] supported by a post hoc perceived rationale”284 may be upheld, but 
without such a rationale, “it is aptly described as a naked transfer of 
wealth.”285  The court reasoned that “naked economic preferences are 
impermissible to the extent that they harm consumers,”286 indicating that 
the regulations at issue impermissibly harmed consumers through higher 
prices. 287 
C.  The Tenth Circuit in Powers v. Harris: Economic Protectionism Is a 
Legitimate State Interest 
The plaintiffs in Powers—individuals who wished to sell caskets online 
in the state of Oklahoma without obtaining a license288—sued members of 
the Oklahoma State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors, seeking 
declaratory relief.289  After losing in the Western District of Oklahoma, the 
plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the Oklahoma 
licensing law violated the Privileges or Immunities, Equal Protection, and 
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.290  The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the district court.291 
The Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act (FSLA) requires that any 
individual selling funeral-service merchandise, including caskets,292 must 
 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at *4. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at *1. 
 288. The plaintiffs operated an internet company that sold caskets within the state through 
an in-state server and did not have a physical store. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 
1213 n.9 (10th Cir. 2004).  The parties and the court assumed that the server’s location in the 
state was sufficient to render it the internet company’s place of business, and thus subject to 
Oklahoma state regulation. See id. 
 289. Id. at 1211. 
 290. Id.  At the district court level, the plaintiffs also argued that the Oklahoma Funeral 
Services Licensing Act (FSLA) violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. See id. at 1214 
n.11.  The Tenth Circuit confirmed that given the district court’s findings of fact, the 
doctrine was inapplicable, and furthermore, that the claim was waived as plaintiffs did not 
assert it on appeal. See id.  For an argument that the funeral regulations are unconstitutional 
under the Commerce Clause, see Agarwal & Ellig, supra note 188. 
 291. See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1211. 
 292. See id. at 1212 n.1 (explaining that funeral-service merchandise, as defined by the 
FSLA, includes “the sale of burial supplies and equipment, but excluding the sale by a 
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be a licensed funeral director293 operating out of a funeral establishment.294  
Thus, in order to sell caskets in the state, the FSLA “effectively requires 
that both a funeral director’s license and a funeral establishment license be 
obtained from the Board before a person or entity may lawfully sell 
caskets.”295  Notably, Oklahoma does not apply the licensing scheme to 
those who sell other funeral related merchandise, such as “urns, grave 
markers, monuments, clothing and flowers.”296  In addition, the licensing 
requirements only apply to time-of-need sales, leaving unlicensed 
individuals free to sell pre-paid297 or pre-death caskets as long as they are 
acting as an agent of a licensed funeral director.298  Lastly, the Board only 
enforces the law with respect to intrastate casket sales.299  Plaintiffs wished 
to sell in-state, time-of-need caskets in Oklahoma over the internet, but had 
not done so out of fear that the Board would prosecute them for violating 
the Board rules.300 
Plaintiffs argued that the FSLA violates both equal protection and 
substantive due process.  In addressing the plaintiffs’ challenge, the court 
noted that the proper level of review was rational basis review because the 
case concerned “a state economic regulation that does not affect a 
fundamental right and categorizes people on the basis of a non-suspect 
classification.”301  The court further decided that the plaintiff’s claim was 
“most properly presented as an equal protection claim” since the plaintiffs 
cited mostly equal protection cases—even when making substantive due 
process arguments—and the Supreme Court itself has most often analyzed 
regulatory challenges under the Equal Protection Clause.302 
The Board argued, and the plaintiffs and court agreed, that protecting 
casket purchasers—a vulnerable group—constitutes a legitimate state 
interest.303  Since consumer protection was accepted as a legitimate end of 
state regulation, the parties urged the court to inquire whether the licensing 
 
cemetery of lands or interests therein, services incidental thereto, markers, memorials, 
monuments . . . .” (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 396.2(10))). 
 293. See id. at 1211 n.2 (“The FSLA defines a funeral director as ‘a person who:  sells 
funeral service merchandise to the public . . . .’” (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, 
§ 396.2(2)(d))). 
 294. See id. at 1211. 
 295. Id. at 1212 n.4 (citing Powers v. Harris, No. CIV-01-445-F, 2002 WL 32026155, at 
*11 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2002)). 
 296. Id. at 1212. 
 297. The Oklahoma Insurance Code and Insurance Commissioner regulate sales of 
caskets on a pre-paid basis. See id. at 1212 n.6 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 6121). 
 298. Id. at 1212 & n.5. 
 299. Id. at 1212 (“[A]n unlicensed Oklahoman may sell a time-of-need casket to a 
customer outside of Oklahoma . . . and an unlicensed salesperson who is not located in 
Oklahoma may sell a time-of-need casket to a customer in Oklahoma.”). 
 300. Id. at 1213. 
 301. Id. at 1215. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
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scheme was rationally related to that end.304  The Board admitted that its 
licensure requirements were not perfectly aligned with its goal of consumer 
protection but argued that they met the required “fit” under rational basis 
review.305  Importantly, the Board noted that the licensing scheme was not 
“wholly irrelevant”306 since all the witnesses who testified agreed that those 
purchasing time-of-need caskets were a particularly vulnerable group due to 
the grief that arises from death and, as a result, were susceptible to 
aggressive sales tactics.307 
However, rather than address the question presented by the parties—
whether the FSLA was rationally related to the legitimate interest of 
consumer protection—the court, sua sponte, after concluding that it was 
obligated308 to examine every possible legitimate interest including those 
not advanced by the parties, decided to consider whether “protecting the 
intrastate funeral home industry, absent a violation of a specific 
constitutional provision or a valid federal statute, constitutes a legitimate 
state interest.”309  The court then proceeded to analyze whether economic 
protectionism can be a legitimate state interest, noting that if it is, the 
licensing arrangement was undoubtedly well-tailored to that end, thus easily 
passing rational basis review.310 
Addressing the arguments advanced by Craigmiles, the court pointed out 
that all of the cases relied on were those addressing interstate, as opposed to 
intrastate commerce, and thus inapposite.311  For example, the Powers 
court criticized Craigmiles’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey312 decision, since that case involved a New 
Jersey law that prohibited importing waste that originated outside of the 
state.313 
 
 304. Id.  The urge to protect grieving family members surrounding funerals also finds 
fruition in tort law, where during the late nineteenth century an exception to the general rule 
against recovery for pure emotional harm existed that permitted family members to recover 
for their emotional distress occurring during or in conjunction with funeral preparations. See 
JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW:  
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 721–22 (2d ed. 2008) (citing Mentzer v. W. Union Tel. Co., 
62 N.W. 1 (Iowa 1895)); see also Gregory C. Keating, Is Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress a Freestanding Tort?, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1159 n.78 (2009). 
 305. See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1216 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993)). 
 306. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993) (“A statutory classification fails 
rational-basis review only when it ‘rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of 
the State’s objective.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 
60, 71 (1978))). 
 307. See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1216 (citing Powers v. Harris, No. CIV-01-445-F, 2002 WL 
32026155, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2002)). 
 308. See id. at 1217 (citing Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto, 253 F.3d 137, 146 (1st Cir. 
2001)). 
 309. Id. at 1218. 
 310. See id. (citing Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 228 (6th Cir. 2002)). 
 311. See id. at 1219–21. 
 312. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
 313. See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1219. 
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As Powers explained, the distinction between intrastate and interstate 
commerce is relevant, since the policies behind—as well as the textual hook 
of—the Dormant Commerce Clause cases do not apply to intrastate 
commerce analyzed under the Equal Protection or Due Processes 
Clauses.314  The state-promulgated economic protectionist regulation the 
Dormant Commerce Clause forbids is that which protects a state from 
competition in the larger national economy.315  As the Tenth Circuit pointed 
out, “[o]ur country’s constitutionally enshrined policy favoring a national 
marketplace is simply irrelevant as to whether a state may legitimately 
protect one intrastate industry as against another when the challenge to the 
statute is purely one of equal protection.”316  Thus, the Tenth Circuit 
reasoned that only by engaging in “selective quotation”317 from interstate 
commerce cases could the Craigmiles court have concluded that the 
Supreme Court had weighed in on the issue. 
The Powers court ultimately found that “intra-state economic 
protectionism, absent a violation of a specific federal statutory or 
constitutional provision, is a legitimate state interest”318 and, therefore, it 
undoubtedly passes rational basis review.319  To reach this conclusion, the 
court focused its analysis on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Fitzgerald v. 
Racing Association of Central Iowa,320 New Orleans v. Dukes,321 and Lee 
Optical.322 
Fitzgerald involved an equal protection challenge by racetrack gambling 
institutions to the preferential tax rates afforded riverboat gambling and 
racetrack gambling casinos.323  The Supreme Court upheld the tax scheme, 
finding “help[ing] the riverboat industry” to be a legitimate state goal.324  In 
Dukes, the Supreme Court upheld a New Orleans ordinance that prohibited 
the selling of foodstuffs from pushcarts in the French Quarter, yet allowed 
those who had been selling food out of such carts for at least eight years to 
continue operating, thus reducing the number of pushcart operators to 
two.325  As the Powers court discussed,326 the Supreme Court rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument that the New Orleans ordinance violated the Equal 
 
 314. See id. at 1220. 
 315. See id. at 1219. 
 316. See id. at 1220. 
 317. See id. at 1219. 
 318. Id. at 1222.  The Powers court believed such a conclusion reflected Supreme Court 
precedent. See id. at 1220 (“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently held that protecting or 
favoring one particular intrastate industry, absent a specific federal constitutional or statutory 
violation, is a legitimate state interest.”). 
 319. Id. at 1219–23 (“There can be no serious dispute that the FSLA is ‘very well 
tailored’ to protecting the intrastate funeral-home industry.” (quoting Craigmiles v. Giles, 
312 F.3d 220, 228 (6th Cir. 2002))). 
 320. 539 U.S. 103 (2003). 
 321. 427 U.S. 297 (1967). 
 322. See infra notes 115–20 and accompanying text. 
 323. See Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. 103 (2003). 
 324. Id. at 110. 
 325. See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 305. 
 326. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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Protection Clause by creating “a protected monopoly for the favored class 
member[s],”327 reasoning that the ordinance might have been implemented 
to stimulate tourism in the French Quarter.328  Thus, it was legitimate for 
the city to eliminate vendors in the heart of the French Quarter, as failing to 
do so might have reduced tourism and thus harm the city’s economy.329 
The Powers court then took a direct jab at the Craigmiles court, noting 
that Craigmiles focused on the “actual motives of the Tennessee 
Legislature,” into which the Supreme Court has foreclosed inquiry.330  The 
court further attacked the Craigmiles court for equating the funeral-industry 
licensing scheme to the schemes at issue in the decisions that analyzed 
statutes under the rational-basis plus standard, such as Romer.331  The 
majority opinion concluded by noting that a bill to amend the FLSA to 
favor unlicensed casket retailers has been introduced three times, but never 
made it past the committee stage.332 
Judge Tymkovich’s concurrence in Powers argued that the legislative 
scheme met the rational basis test and agreed with the majority that some 
courts have upheld regulations that favor some economic interest over 
others, but parted company with the majority in its belief that the cases 
relied upon by the majority “rest on a fundamental foundation:  the 
discriminatory legislation arguably advances either the general welfare or a 
public interest.”333  The concurrence argued that the Supreme Court has 
always required a public interest be served when a regulation appears to 
advance one group’s interest over another’s.334  Thus, the concurrence 
rejected what it perceived as the majority’s per se approval of intrastate 
protectionist legislation.335 
III.  UNEARTHING THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND RECOGNIZING ECONOMIC 
PROTECTIONISM OF AN IN-STATE INDUSTRY AS A 
LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST 
This Part asserts that the court in Powers was correct in holding that 
naked intrastate economic protectionism, absent a federal statutory or 
constitutional violation, should be recognized as a legitimate state interest. 
Part III first argues that the actual purpose behind the casket licensing 
schemes is most likely to protect the funeral services industry from 
 
 327. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 300 (citation omitted). 
 328. See id. at 304–05. 
 329. See id. 
 330. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1223 (citing FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 
(1993)). 
 331. See id. at 1224–25. 
 332. See id. at 1225 (“While these failures may lead Plaintiffs to believe that the 
legislature is ignoring their voices of reason, the Constitution simply does not guarantee 
political success.”). 
 333. Id. (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
 334. See id. at 1225–26 (noting, for example, that in Fitzgerald the Court couched its 
protection of river-boat operators as an effort to preserve economic prosperity). 
 335. See id. at 1226. 
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competition, but that the Craigmiles court incorrectly ratcheted up judicial 
review by aligning itself with Romer and Cleburne and looking into the 
actual purpose and motivation behind the legislation.  Similarly, this Part 
argues that the Craigmiles court erred when it cited Commerce Clause cases 
in a conclusory manner to support its assertion that the Supreme Court has 
held that economic protectionism is not a legitimate state interest. 
This part next contends that the Tenth Circuit in Powers did not follow 
Supreme Court precedent since it made explicit the Supreme Court’s 
implicit acceptance of economic protectionism as a legitimate state interest.  
However, this part continues to argue that Powers reached the correct 
outcome in upholding the licensing requirement because rational basis 
review requires a very high level of deference to legislative enactments. 
Ultimately, this part argues that the Supreme Court, if it decides to hear 
this issue, should recognize pure economic protectionism of an in-state 
industry as a legitimate state interest, precisely because economic 
protectionism itself may promote the public good.  By relying on Dukes and 
Fitzgerald, the Powers decision implicitly makes this argument, 
determining that states may rationally believe that protecting a particular 
industry from competition benefits the general population of the state.  
Lastly, this part addresses arguments against recognizing in-state economic 
protectionism as a legitimate state interest. 
A.  The Purpose of the State Funeral Regulations Is Likely To Benefit 
Special Interests 
This section argues that the state casket-sales regulations likely reflect the 
actual product of interest group rent seeking.  The next section shows 
however, why such a conclusion is irrelevant under current rational basis 
review, and thus the Craigmiles court was incorrect in striking down the 
regulations. 
The true purpose of the regulations is likely protectionism of the funeral 
services industry, because they do not actually advance any of the other 
purported state interests.  For example, they do not further the interest of 
preventing groundwater leakage because in Louisiana and Tennessee, there 
are no regulations that mandate the specifications of a casket.336  Rather, a 
purchaser in Tennessee or Louisiana is free to choose any casket to use at 
burial.337  In fact, in Louisiana no regulation mandates the use of a casket at 
all for burial.338  It is not illegal for a body to be buried directly in the 
ground.339  If the actual motivation behind these regulations concerned 
groundwater leakage, these states could pass laws requiring the use of 
caskets at burial, and require stringent casket specifications.340  Thus, due to 
the lack of regulations detailing which type of caskets must be used, the 
 
 336. See supra notes 254–57, 281–82 and accompanying text. 
 337. See supra notes 255, 282 and accompanying text. 
 338. See supra note 282 and accompanying text. 
 339. See supra note 282 and accompanying text. 
 340. See supra notes 256–58 and accompanying text. 
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states are likely not actually trying to regulate in order to protect their 
citizens from groundwater contamination.341 
They also do not further other legitimate state interests because as the 
current regulations stand, a citizen of Oklahoma is free to purchase a casket 
from anyone—be it a monk, a non–funeral director retailer, or even 
Walmart’s website—as long as that person does not operate out of their 
home state.342  If the state was actually concerned about the quality of 
caskets sold or wanted its casket-sales people to have sufficient grief-
counseling training, the regulations would reflect these concerns.343  If 
these states actually believed that people selling funeral merchandise should 
be trained in grief counseling, such training could be mandated for all 
funeral operators—something that it is not currently required.  The 
regulations therefore do not further that purported state interest. 
Similarly, the argument that the state seeks to protect consumers by 
restricting casket sales to funeral directors because the FTC’s Funeral Rule 
only applies to funeral directors and not third-party retailers, is also not 
likely the actual motivation behind the regulations.344  The FTC contends 
that the Louisiana regulations frustrate the purposes of the Funeral Rule.345  
The purpose of the Funeral Rule is to increase transparency in pricing and 
to foster competition in the industry.346  The FTC has found that third-party 
casket retailers do not pose harm to competition, but rather improve 
competition by expanding consumer choice.347  Furthermore, the evidence 
suggests that third-party retailers are not prone to abuses such as bundling, 
since announcing their (usually lower) prices helps them compete in the 
industry.348  Third-party retailers are not unconstrained from abusive 
practices, since the FTC can bring an enforcement action under section 5 of 
the FTC Act for false or misleading statements or unfair marketing, and 
traditional unfair competition and tort and contract remedies remain 
available.349  Thus, as stressed by the FTC, the third-party casket sellers do 
not actually pose a threat to consumer protection. 
 
 341. See supra notes 256–58 and accompanying text. 
 342. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra notes 303–07 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text; see also Brief for the FTC As 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 14, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756 
(5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2011) (“[T]here is no merit to the argument . . . that, because the Funeral 
Rule does not itself cover independent casket retailers, only licensed funeral directors should 
be able to sell caskets.”). 
 345. See Brief for the FTC As Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 15–16, St. 
Joseph Abbey, No. 11-30756. 
 346. See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text. 
 348. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 349. See Brief for the FTC As Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 15, St. Joseph 
Abbey, No. 11-30756. 
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B.  Craigmiles:  Incorrect in Engaging in More Searching Review and 
Relying on Dormant Commerce Clause Cases 
The Sixth350 and Tenth351 Circuits and the Eastern District of 
Louisiana352 agree that the purpose behind the casket-sales restriction was 
pure economic protectionism.353  However, the courts differed about 
whether this was a legitimate state interest.  Unlike the court in Teague, 
which concluded that the Virginia licensing scheme furthered the public 
purpose of ensuring competency in funeral arrangement,354 the Sixth 
Circuit and the Eastern District of Louisiana recognized that the purpose the 
respective state licensing schemes effectuated was protecting the in-state 
funeral services industry, which they found illegitimate.355 
However, looking to the actual purpose behind legislative enactments has 
no place in rational basis review.356  Rather, rational basis review only 
requires hypothetical or theoretical justifications for a law and does not 
require that the law actually be passed for that purpose.357  The following 
subsection explains why Craigmiles and St. Joseph Abbey erred by ignoring 
such hypothetical rationales and utilizing heightened rational basis “with 
bite.”358 
This Part argues that courts should not rely on interstate commerce cases 
or rational basis “with bite” cases when analyzing economic regulations 
under the Equal Protection or the Due Process Clauses.  Part III.B.1 asserts 
that the Court’s decisions in Romer and Cleburne do not support applying a 
more searching form of rational basis review to economic licensing 
regulations.  Part III.B.2 argues that interstate commerce cases are 
inapposite and dubious precedent for intrastate commerce causes. 
1.  Romer and Cleburne Are Not Applicable for Casket Licensing 
The Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles improperly applied a more searching 
standard than traditional rational basis by citing the Romer and Cleburne 
decisions.359  The Sixth Circuit followed such an approach by 
acknowledging that in order for a statute to be invalidated under rational 
basis review, it must reek of “the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated 
 
 350. See supra notes 244–46 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra note 318 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
 353. Cf. supra note 270 (describing lobbying efforts by the funeral industry). 
 354. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra Part II.B–C. 
 356. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text; see also Briana J. Gorod, Case 
Note, Does Lochner Live?:  The Disturbing Implications of Craigmiles v. Giles, 21 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 537 (2003) (discussing Craigmiles’ inappropriate reliance on Cleburne’s 
heightened standard of review). 
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dead fish.”360  The Sixth Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Romer and Cleburne as examples of statutes that have risen to that level of 
“pungence.”361  However, the Sixth Circuit erred in holding the Tennessee 
regulation subject to this same level of scrutiny. 
The Romer and Cleburne decisions, while purportedly using rational 
basis review, involved a more searching level of review than typically 
applied.362  This was because the Court perceived the laws to be motivated 
at least in part by discrimination, and aimed at a “bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group” and thus looked into the actual reason behind 
the law.363  In contrast, the casket licensing restrictions are not motivated by 
animus or discrimination against a politically unpopular group.364  Rather, 
they are economic regulations, which like all licensing schemes harm those 
that do not have the time, money, or ability to gain the requisite credentials 
to be eligible for a license.365  This group cannot be deemed a historically 
politically unpopular group to the extent of homosexuals or the mentally ill.  
This is a far cry from the type of “pungence” required to invalidate a law 
using rational basis review.  Thus, the Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles was 
incorrect in elevating its standard of review and inquiring into the actual 
motivation behind the legislation as the Supreme Court did in Cleburne and 
Romer. 
2.  Mistaking the Intrastate for the Interstate 
In addition to unjustifiably using rational basis “with bite” cases for 
support, the Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles improperly relied on cases having 
to do with interstate, as opposed to intrastate, commerce in reaching its 
conclusion that intrastate economic protectionism is not a legitimate state 
interest.366 
The policy behind preventing interstate economic protectionism is to 
prevent barriers to the development and maintenance of a national 
marketplace.367  Furthermore, the textual hook for interstate economic 
protectionism’s unconstitutionality derives from the enumerated right of the 
 
 360. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Searan, 259 F.3d 434, 447 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also supra note 247 
and accompanying text. 
 361. See supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra notes 156–59, 246–50 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra Part II. 
 365. If a monopoly results, such regulations may also potentially hurt consumers through 
higher prices. Cf. supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text. But see supra note 198 and 
accompanying text (discussing how the “one-monopoly-rent” hypothesis suggests that 
consumers are not harmed by state casket-sale restrictions).  In any event, the presence of 
potentially harmed consumers does not turn an economic licensing scheme into a 
discriminatory scheme aimed to harm a politically unpopular group. 
 366. See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text. 
 367. See supra note 315 and accompanying text. 
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federal government over interstate commerce.368  Thus, the Supreme Court 
precedent on interstate economic protectionism does not support a finding 
that intrastate economic protectionism of a wholly in-state industry is a 
legitimate state interest under the Due Process or Equal Protection 
Clauses.369 
C.  Powers:  Correct in Upholding the Licensing Scheme 
While Powers was correct in upholding the licensing scheme, it made a 
jurisprudential error by making explicit what courts applying rational basis 
review often implicitly do, which is to uphold purely protectionist 
regulations.  Stated differently, the court in Powers erred in not paying lip 
service to a more general conception of the health and safety rationale of 
the traditional police powers, even though the outcome of the case was 
correctly decided.  What the Powers court should have done to align itself 
with explicit Supreme Court precedent was follow the courts’ approaches in 
Teague and Stone Casket. 
1.  Supreme Court Precedent:  Requirement That Regulations Be Passed for 
Public Purposes 
The Tenth Circuit in Powers diverged from explicit Supreme Court 
precedent by holding that the state had a legitimate interest in aiming to 
benefit the funeral services industry by awarding it a regulatory monopoly 
in casket sales.370  Supreme Court precedent reveals that even in West 
Coast Hotel371 and the deferential cases following it, such as Lee Optical, 
the Court has tethered its decisions to finding that the state could have 
rationally concluded that it was using its traditional police powers to 
advance the public health, safety, or some other neutral goal372 for the 
general public.373 
As the concurrence in Powers argued, the majority in Powers departed 
from the traditional application of equal protection and due process analysis 
under rational basis review, where the legitimate state interest discussion 
focuses on whether the state is aiming to serve the general public and not 
arbitrarily awarding benefits or harming individuals.374 
 
 368. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also supra notes 314–15 and accompanying 
text. 
 369. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text. 
 370. See supra Part II.C. 
 371. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text. 
 374. See supra notes 333–35 and accompanying text. 
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2.  Rational Basis’s Deferential Approach Suggests That the Powers Court 
Was Correct in Upholding the Regulation 
There is a rift between what the Supreme Court says it does (which is 
require some traditional public purpose for regulations to be legitimate), 
and what it actually does, which is uphold patently protectionist 
regulations.375  For example, in Lee Optical, the law was most likely a 
protectionist law aimed at protecting business for optometrists and 
ophthalmologists, and yet the Court upheld the law, finding it a legitimate 
exercise of police power, and thus not a violation of the Due Process 
Clause.376 
This rift occurs due to the very deferential standard judges apply when 
reviewing such legislation.  Under traditional rational basis review, the 
actual motivation behind the law is irrelevant, as any conceivable—
even hypothetical—set of facts will support a finding of constitutionality.377 
 Thus, under traditional rational basis review, the restrictive casket-sale 
regulations should have been upheld.  It is certainly conceivable that the 
legislatures believed that restricting casket sales to funeral directors 
protected against leaky caskets, regardless of the fact that if this was their 
chief concern, they could have passed a more narrowly tailored law.  The 
legislature could also have rationally concluded that mandating casket sales 
through funeral directors would encourage more people to buy a casket, and 
thus lower ground contamination. 
It is also conceivable that the state legislators took a different view than 
the FTC and deemed that by not being covered by the Funeral Rule against 
deceptive practices, third-party retailers could harm consumers by selling 
cheap, but low quality caskets that might cause emotional harm to 
consumers.378  Thus, the State may have a legitimate interest in protecting 
grieving families from the emotional distress incidental to purchasing a 
 
 375. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting that Lee Optical in all likelihood 
involved a protectionist law); see also Clark Neily, No Such Thing:  Litigating Under the 
Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 898, 905 (2005) (“[T]here is a yawning chasm 
between the Court’s rhetoric, which still refers—accurately—to occupational freedom as a 
constitutional right, and the Court’s holdings, which no longer provide any meaningful 
protection for that right and instead permit legislators to trample and abuse the right with 
near total impunity.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 376. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 377. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 378. It is not inconceivable that a poor quality casket could result in severe emotional 
harm to grieving relatives.  See Baynes v. George E. Mason Funeral Home, Inc., No. 3:09-
CV-153, 2011 WL 2181469, at *3 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (“[The] funeral director . . . called . . . 
with some tragic news, and told him that the casket containing Trey’s remains had ‘failed.’ 
. . . [resulting in a] sight that was an affront to the most fundamental dignity of human 
nature; the casket was deteriorating, corroding, rusting, and leaking a blue fluid.  The 
casket also emitted a horrendous odor.  [The plaintiff] learned that the bronze casket he had 
purchased was in fact made of steel.”); Hirst v. Elgin Metal Casket Co., 438 F. Supp. 906, 
908 (D. Mont. 1977) (finding that mental anguish reasonably resulted when a deceased 
family member’s leak-proof casket leaked). 
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shoddy casket.379  Since the practice of requiring only a hypothetical 
justification is extremely deferential to states, the Tenth Circuit in Powers 
was correct in upholding the casket-sales restriction. 
D.  Unearthing the Public Interest:  Why Economic Protectionism Should 
Be Deemed a Legitimate State Interest 
Current substantive due process and equal protection review of licensing 
restrictions remains extremely deferential to a state’s purported justification 
for using its police power.380  This deference reflects the federal judiciary’s 
unwillingness to second-guess the legislative will of democratically elected 
state legislatures.381  However, while courts have shown great deference to 
states’ purported justifications for laws, they still require the law’s 
purported purpose to fit into the liberal police power paradigm.382  Thus, in 
order for a law to be legitimate, it must at least pay lip service to the 
advancement of the traditional conception of the health, safety, or general 
welfare of the public.383  Instead of keeping up this inequitable charade,384 
courts should explicitly broaden their conception of the police powers.  
Therefore, courts should redefine their understanding of the police powers 
in light of post–New Deal jurisprudence and acknowledge economic 
protectionism as a legitimate state interest. 
1.  Post–New Deal Conception of the Public-Private Divide Supports 
Economic Protectionism As a Legitimate State Interest 
In the post–New Deal era, the Court’s conception of the public-private 
divide has shifted.385  While previously very suspicious of legislative 
impulses to regulate in spheres traditionally deemed private, such as an 
employer’s contract terms with its employees, the Court in West Coast 
Hotel signaled a shift in its conception of the baseline, viewing employer-
employee relations as sufficiently public to justify legislative 
intervention.386 
 
 379. Cf. supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 380. See supra Part I.B.3, I.C.2–3. 
 381. See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text. 
 382. See supra Part I.A.1, I.C.2. 
 383. Cf. Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion a Legitimate State Interest?  Four 
Recent Cases Test the Boundaries, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023, 1036–39 (2006) 
(using Lockean and Madisonian conceptions of government power to determine which 
statutes are legitimate). 
 384. The inequality stems from the fact that it creates a two-tiered system of rational basis 
review, one which endorses those protectionist laws which can be tethered, however 
disingenuously, to a public purpose, while condemning those laws that lack the fortune of 
being convincingly tied to a public purpose. 
 385. See Part I.B.3. 
 386. See Part I.B.3.  A similar impulse can be identified long before the New Deal in 
Munn, which viewed activities “affected with the public interest” to include those not 
typically deemed sufficiently public, such as natural monopolies or common pools problems, 
to justify the exertion of the police powers. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
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Throughout most of constitutional history, what constitutes a legitimate 
state interest has been conceived of by drawing on the classical liberal 
tradition that the Constitution is grounded in.387  In determining what 
constitutes a legitimate state interest, courts have largely interpreted the 
police powers in terms of the classical liberal tradition, where, under a 
Lockean understanding, state legislative power was only valid if it aimed to 
solve a collective action problem or to regulate a natural monopoly.388 
However, in the post–New Deal world, automatic resort to using the 
political philosophy of the founding to determine the contours of the police 
power raises the same sort of countermajoritarian difficulties that caused the 
Court to abandon Lochner-era laissez-faire constitutionalism back in 
1937.389  Rather, in the modern era, courts should defer to legislative 
majorities’ conception of the political philosophy they wish to apply when 
measuring which state interests are legitimate.  This solves the 
countermajoritarian dilemma and echoes the strands of populist thought 
found in Holmes’s dissent in Lochner.390  
This approach would allow states to regulate to effectuate broader public 
ends than conceived of under classic police powers.  For example, 
economic protectionism of an in-state industry should be viewed as 
sufficiently general to justify legislating toward that end.  As evidenced in 
Dukes and Fitzgerald, a state may have a perfectly valid public reason for 
protecting an in-state industry, even one that maintains an in-state 
monopoly.391  Protecting the river boat gambling industry or the food-cart 
sellers was legitimate, because protecting those in-state industries from 
competition could conceivably help the general population of the state 
through either higher tax revenues or through more tourism to the state.392 
Thus the Supreme Court should make explicit its implicit recognition that 
aiming to protect or assist an in-state industry is a legitimate state interest393 
 
 387. Cf. Sandefur, supra note 164, at 497 (“A law may accomplish any purpose within 
the boundaries of ‘legitimate state interests.’  Those boundaries can only be set by political 
philosophy.”).  Sandefur argues that, in determining what political philosophy to apply, 
courts should turn to the American founding as their guide, which Sandefur believes abhors 
“naked preferences.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 388. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 389. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 390. See supra Part I.B.1.b. 
 391. See supra notes 320–29 and accompanying text. 
 392. See supra notes 328–29 and accompanying text. 
 393. For scholars who disagree with this conclusion, see Asheesh Agarwal, Protectionism 
As a Rational Basis?  The Impact on E-commerce in the Funeral Industry, 3 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 189, 217 (2007); Timothy Sandefur, The Right To Earn a Living, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 207 
(2003); Simpson, supra note 168, at 202–03; Jim Thompson, Powers v. Harris:  How the 
Tenth Circuit Buried Economic Liberties, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 585, 600 (2005); Lana 
Harfoush, Comment, Grave Consequences for Economic Liberty:  The Funeral Industry’s 
Protectionist Occupational Licensing Scheme, the Circuit Split, and Why It Matters, 5 J. 
BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 135, 159 (2001); Hood, supra note 176, at 465–75 (arguing 
for increased judicial review for economic regulations by using Macey’s cannon of statutory 
construction); Anthony B. Sanders, Comment, Exhumation Through Burial:  How 
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precisely because it has the potential to affect the general welfare of the 
state. 
2.  Counterarguments Do Not Persuasively Alter This Conclusion 
Finding pure economic protectionism as a legitimate state interest may 
result in the establishment and maintenance of certain in-state monopolies 
and drive up the prices for consumers.394  However, Supreme Court 
precedent has stated that courts should not impose a particular economic 
theory on the states.395  Requiring states to outlaw regulations that through 
taxation or occupational licensing schemes award benefits to certain in-state 
classes, would invalidate a wide range of legislation and pose a slippery 
slope problem, as the Powers court noted.396  Making it unconstitutional for 
a state to protect a particular industry through regulation goes against the 
federalism and judicial-activism concerns underpinning the Court’s 
economic substantive due process jurisprudence since the demise of 
Lochner.397 
Applying interest group theory fails to persuasively alter the conclusion 
that pure economic protection of an in-state industry should be a legitimate 
state interest.398  Federalism concerns would attach to finding intrastate 
economic protectionism unconstitutional, as such a finding would impose a 
normative baseline of efficiency on the states that favor redistribution of 
monopoly profits to the consumer over the producer.399  Rather, such a 
baseline should be determined by the states.  On basic federalism terms, the 
federal government’s imposition of its economic theory through the Due 
Process Clause on the states is unconstitutional.  Rather, these sorts of 
concerns are more appropriately addressed by antitrust or unfair 
competition laws. 
Another argument against finding in-state economic protectionism a 
legitimate state interest is that if the handing out of benefits to certain in-
state actors at the expense of others constitutes a legitimate interest under 
current Supreme Court jurisprudence, then the first step of rational basis 
 
Challenging Casket Regulations Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in 
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review is wholly unnecessary.400  Rather, courts would simply ask whether 
the law was rationally related to protecting that interest and, as the court in 
Powers noted, the casket sales restrictions are very well tailored to the end 
of protecting funeral establishments from competition.401  Thus, the 
argument goes that such a finding would in effect write federal review of 
economic regulations out of the Constitution, causing separation of powers 
concerns.402 
However, this conclusion overblows the effect of such a finding.  While 
such a construction would allow economic protectionist legislation to stand, 
it would not completely end federal review of state economic regulations.  
For example, if a regulation cannot even be tethered to economic 
protectionism, but is instead clearly just a legislative favor to a particular 
corporation or individual, such a law would not be legitimate. 
Lastly, recognizing economic protectionism as a legitimate state interest 
may in fact restrict entry to some entrepreneurs and, in such regard, impact 
their ability to practice the trade or profession of their choosing.403  
However, courts should not resort to Lochner-era substantive due process, 
or engage in searching review of economic legislation under the Equal 
Protection Clause in order to protect the “right to earn a living.”404  The 
countermajoritarian reasons behind the retreat from Lochner remain in 
effect today.  While extremely sympathetic arguments can be made in favor 
of recognizing such a fundamental right, the ills posed by not recognizing 
such a right could be better addressed through other legal doctrines, 
constitutional or otherwise.405  Ultimately, states should be allowed to 
experiment with their preferred economic theory,406 and the federal 
government should not unduly infringe on the states’ police powers through 
the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. 
 
 400. See Thompson, supra note 393, at 601 (2005) (“Could a majority now pass a law 
enjoining a certain individual or group from participating in a business for any reason at 
all?”). 
 401. See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
 402. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; cf. Sunstein, supra note 77, at 878 
(arguing that “[i]f there is no class of impermissible ends, means-ends scrutiny is 
incoherent”). 
 403. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 404. See Sandefur, supra note 164, at 496–503 (advocating for courts to elevate judicial 
review under the Equal Protection Clause to protect the right to earn a living by avoiding 
speculative rationales for the legislation and requiring a more searching review of the fit 
between means and ends). 
 405. See, e.g., id. at 466–67 (noting that monopolies have been used “as a weapon against 
racial minorities or other politically unpopular groups”).  If the main concern surrounds 
cutting off access to racial and ethnic minorities, these sorts of ills might be better addressed 
through a revitalization of the treatment of disparate impact under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  However, full examination of these issues is outside the scope of this Note. 
 406. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
The courts of appeals are currently split on whether a state can 
legitimately proscribe the selling of caskets by all in-state actors except 
those licensed as funeral directors.  The central debate surrounding these 
economic licensing cases is whether economic protectionism of an in-state 
industry can be a legitimate state interest.  Supreme Court precedent reveals 
that in order to exercise their police power legitimately, states must tether 
their regulations to a public purpose.  However, because of the amount of 
deference states are afforded under current economic substantive due 
process and equal protection, protectionist legislation can still be 
legitimately passed as long as some—albeit theoretical or hypothetical—
benefit could arguably be linked to the public generally.  Thus even laws 
with the sole purpose and effect of awarding purely private benefits to an 
in-state industry can be legitimately enacted.  In response, courts should not 
require a link to a traditional police power of health, safety, or general 
welfare, and instead find that pure economic protectionism of an in-state 
industry is a legitimate state interest precisely because the state may 
conclude that such a regulation plausibly serves the general public. 
